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Editor's Brief
Four articles in this issue represent development of diverse areas of Virginia law.
Our first article focuses on an aspect of the national concern over the AIDS virus.
However, the five articles do more than convey information about the topics they
contain. They are samples of the caliber of writing that the students of the College
of William and Mary's Marshall-Wythe School of Law produce every semester.
The disease of AIDS has spawned much discussion in legal circles concerning
societal treatment of its victims. Mr. Sotelo assesses federal laws regarding the handicapped and their applicability to AIDS sufferers in our first article.
Contrasted with the emotionally charged topic of AIDS is the subject ofliquidated
damages provisions in construction contracts. Ms. Soraghan's work discusses the validity of such provisions when both the contractor and the contractor's customer are
responsible for a delay in the completion of a project.
Mr. Gray's piece invites legislative or judicial reform of Virginia's libel law as
its affects public school teachers and the press in small towns. He argues that the
protection of the teachers afforded by the current state of the defamation case law
comes at the expense of threatening the viability of small town publishers, who thrive
on coverage of such figures.
In an increasingly crowded society, determination of land use rights are critical.
Mr. Lady discusses competing lines of precedent in deciding whether and at what
stage land use rights vest in their holders.
Should a person who kills another human being during the comission of a felony
be chargeable with murder or manslaughter? Mr. Thomas' article thoroughly reviews
the confusion of the Virginia courts in dealing with this difficult legal question, and
offers suggested jury instructions when the situation arises.
I wish to make a special note of thanks to Mr. Thomas the Managing Editor, for
all his hard work in making this issue one of our best to date.
We here at The Colonial Lawyer: A Journal of Virginia Law and Public Policy
hope that you, the scholar and the practitioner, find the following articles of Volume
17 Number 2 insightful and stimulating, and we welcome any comments you might
have for this or future issues.
Felicia L. Silber
Senior Editor
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AIDS: HANDICAP OR NOT?
INTRODUCTION
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a problem of economic,
ethical, legal, medical, political, and social dimensions.

One issue that cuts across

the legal and social dimensions of AIDS is the possibility of discrimination in the
workplace.

The thesis of this paper is that persons who have contracted AIDS or

ARC (AIDS-related complex) or who are infected with the virus (HTLV-II1 [human
T cell lymphotropic virus type III] or HIV [Human Immunodeficiency Syndrome»
or who are perceived as carriers of AIDS are "individual[s] with [a] handicap(s)"l
and thus protected by anti-discrimination statutes.
Part I will describe the significance of the AIDS problem and the nature of
the syndrome.

Part II will analyze whether persons with AIDS, ARC, HTL V-III,

or who are perceived as having AIDS, are individuals with a handicap within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Act).

Part III reviews case law

dealing with the issue of whether AIDS can be classified as a handicap.

Part IV

discusses the reason for classifying such persons as handicapped.
PART I
"The

United

States Public Health

Service has

called

Acquired

Immune

Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) the nation's number one health priority."2

The

extent of the AIDS problem is apparent when one considers both the number of
persons who have contracted AIDS and the number of persons who are estimated
to be infected with the virus.

By May of 1988, the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) had received a total of 62,000 reports of AIDS cases. s
The total is
1
29 U.S.C. Sec. 706(8)(b) (Supp. IV 1986). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
utilized the phrase "handicapped individual" and was amended in 1986 to
"individual with handicaps":
The term "handicapped individual is changed to
"individual with handicaps." This change was
suggested by persons representing individuals
with disabilities who testified before the
Subcommittee that by retaining the adjective
"handicapped" before the noun "person" the
legislation might be inadvertently adding to the
stereotype that persons with handicaps are less
worthy.
H.R. 571, 99th Con g., 2d Sess. Sec. 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Congo & Admin.
News 3471, 3487.

2 Note, The Constitutional Right oj AIDS Carriers, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1274
(1986) (citing to U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FACTS ABOUT AIDS I (1984».
S
Washington Post, June 3, 1988, at Al & A14. In Virginia, 784 cases of
AIDS have been reported, while it is estimated that between 23,000 to 78,000
persons are infected with HTLV-Ill. 6 Port Folio Magazine 10 (August 16, 1988).

expected to continue to increase in the future:'

Approximately 1.5 million

Americans are infected with the virus that has the potential of causing AIDS or
ARC.5
HTLV-1I1 is the virus that mayor may not cause AIDS.

A person infected

with the virus may remain asymptomatic, develop ARC, or progress to a case of
AIDS.6

AIDS is the possible severe result of HTLV-III infection.

"AIDS is a

syndrome,,1 that attacks and breaks down the immune system of a person and
makes him susc~ptible to infection. 8 The suppressing of the immune system makes
the

body

susceptible

to

"opportunistic"

diseases. 9

Pneumocystis

carini;

pneumonia 10 and Karposi's sarcoma 11 are two examples of opportunistic diseases
associated with AIDS ..
The symptoms of AIDS are physical and mental.

Physical effects range from

weight loss to consistently swollen glands, coughing or shortness of breath to
skin rashes and spots. 12

AIDS also decreases the ability of the mind to remember

4
Washington Post, June 3, 1988, at Al & A14. "According to the most
recent PHS· estimates, that figure [62,OOOJ will grow nearly five times to 300?000
by the end of 1992." Id.

5.

Id.
The Public Health Service (PHS) estimates
that up to 1.5 million Americans are now
infected with the AIDS virus. Many of them
do not know they are infected. And federal
officials now believe that infected people
could all eventually become ill if no
effective treatment is developed. Id.

6

V. Gong, AIDS: Facts and Issues, 10-12 (V. Gong and N. Rudnick, eds. 1986).

1 W. Banta, AIDS in the Workplace, 1-2 (1988). AIDS opens people up to
disease and infection that results in death. AIDS does not directly cause the
fatality. Id.
8
P. Douglas & L. Pinsky, The Essential AIDS Fact Book, 13 (1987).
Center for Disease Control defines AIDS as:
absence of all known underlying causes
of cellular immunodeficiency (other than
HTL V -III/LA V infection) and absence of
all other causes of reduced resistance
reported to be associated with at least
one of those opportunistic diseases.
W. Dornette, AIDS and the Law, 264 app. B (1987).

9

P. Douglas & L. Pinsky, The Essential AIDS Fact Book, IS (1987).

10

V. Gong, supra note 6, at 65-67.

11

Id. at 80-85.

'12

Id. at 49-53.
2

The

or recall information (dementia).IS

The almost certain result of AIDS is death.14

ARC (AIDS-related complex) is a less severe, usually non-fatal possible result of
HTLV-III infection.15 ARC mayor may not progress into AIDS.
AIDS is an acquired syndrome. The weight of data lies against being infected
via casual contact with a person infected with the virus, ARC, or AIDS.16 HTL VIII cannot be -transmitted through contact such as handshakes, hugging, sharing of
food and beverages with a person who is either infected with the virus, ARC, or
AIDS.17 The reason for this is that the virus is fragile. 18 For example, the
human skin acts as a barrier to the virus and prevents it from entering the
bloodstream. 19

The virus must enter the bloodstream of a person to represent a

danger of infection.
Transmission occurs in a number of ways.
fluids

(semen,

vaginal,

cervical

secretions)

The first is the transfer of bodily
during

sexual

contact. 20

The

transmission can occur during vaginal, rectum, or oral-genital sex and to a

IS Picot, Living in the Shadows 0/ AIDS, 6 Port Folio Magazine 9 (August
16, 1988).
14

Washington Post, supra note 4, at Al & A4.
Because no one has ever been cured of
AIDS, a 99 percent AIDS rate [based on
a study of homosexual men] means that
virtually all would die unless a treatment is developed. 'The picture gets
worse as we see more data,' said Dr.
William W. Darrow, a researcher at the
federal Center for Disease Control (CDC).
'We have to assume this model would hold
up for all other infected groups as well.' Id.

15

V. Gong, supra note 6, at 13.

16 Douglas & Pinsky, supra note 9, at 19. "Every major scientific study
has concluded that AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact." Id.
17
See generally P. Douglas & L. Pinsky, The Essential AIDS Fact Book,
19-21 (1987), R. Liebmann-Smith, The Question 0/ AIDS, 42-57 (1985).
18 Douglas & Pinsky, supra note 9, at 20.
19

Id. at 18.

20

R. Liebmann-Smith, The Question 0/ AIDS, 42-46 (1985).
Epidemiological studies showed that a
person could contract AIDS from sexual
contact with a single infective individual, that one could be exposed to
such an individual and not contract the
disease, and that some people could
apparently infect others without themselves being clinically ill. Id. at 45.
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greater degree if there exist abrasions to the lining of the vagina, rectum or
areas of

the

mouth.21

Transmission may also occur with

the sharing of

unsterilized needles associated with intra venous-drug use,22 the transfusion of
infected blood and blood products,23 and perinatal. 24
PART II
The Act 25 will be used as a reference point to determine whether those
afflicted with the virus, ARC, or AIDS, or perceived to be infected with AIDS are
individuals with a handicap.

Section 504 of the Act provides that any program

that receives federal funding may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified
individual with a handicap based upon the existence of the handicap.26
congressional

purpose

behind

section

504

was

to

prevent individuals
handicaps from being discriminated against in all phases of life. 27

The
with

The Act distinguishes between three categories of persons for purposes of
determining whether a person has a handicap: I) those individuals with either "a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities,"28

2) those persons who have "a record of such an

impairment,"29 or 3) those persons "regarded as having such an impairment."'3o
21

Douglas & Pinsky, supra note 9, at 18-19.

22

Liebmann-Smith, supra note 20, at 46-50.

23

Supra note 9 at 19.

24

[d.

25
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 701-796 (Supp. IV 1986».
26

29 U.S.C. Sec. 794 (Supp. IV 1986).
No otherwise qualified individual with
handicaps in the United States, as defined
in section 706(8) of this title, shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ... .ld.

27
S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Congo & Admin. News 6373, 6388.
Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped
individuals, ... ,in relation to Federal
assistance in employment, ... , or any
other Federally-aided programs. [d.
28

29 U.S.C. Sec. 706(8)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1986).

29

29 U.S.C. Sec. 706(8)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
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Regulations promulgated define a physical or mental impairment as either a
physiological disorder SI or any mental or psychological disorder. s2
activities" encompass the daily tasks of living such as

working. ss

"Major life

A person who

"has a record of impairment" has either a history of impairment and recovery or
has been misclassified as having an impairment. s• A person "regarded as having
such an impairment" is either a person with a handicap that does not substantially
limit major life activities, except for a person's attitude toward him s5, or a
person who does not possess an impairment but is treated as possessing the
impairmen t. S6
An "otherwise Qualified handicapped" person is one who with reasonable
accommodation by an employer or none at all can perform the tasks of a job. s7
Assessment as to whether reasonable accommodation can be achieved takes in
such factors as undue hardship to the employer, the size of the business or
so 29 U.S.c. Sec. 706(8)(B)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986).
SI

45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(i)(A) (1987).

A physical or mental impairment

means:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic
and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; .... ld.
S2
45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(i)(B) (1987). A physical or mental impairment
can also mean:
(B) any mental or psychological disorder,
such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities. ld.

ss

45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(ii) (1987).
'Major life activities' means functions
such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and
working. ld.

S.

45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(iii) (1987).

S5

45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3 (h)(2)(iv)(A) & (B) (1987).

36

45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(iv)(C) (1987).

37

45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(i) (1987).
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program, facilities, budgetary constraints, type of business or program, and the
nature and cost of accommodation. 38
In determining whether the handicap status of the Act applies to persons
encompassed

within

the

AIDS

issue,

three

groups

of

persons

must

be

differentiated: those individuals with AIDS, those individuals that exhibit symptoms
of

ARC, and

those' individuals that are either carriers of

the

virus

but

asymptomat'ic, members of high risk groups (ie. homosexuals), family members of
AIDS or ARC victims, or those persons perceived as having AIDS.

Persons with

AIDS are individuals with a handicap substantially limiting major life activities.
AIDS victims suffer both physical and mental impairment. The regulations defined
physical impairment as any physiological condition that impacts upon certain body
systems. 39

AIDS impacts upon both the hemic and lymphatic systems of the

immuJU: system. 40

HTL V -III attacks the immune system (breaking down the

function of the hemic and lymphatic systems) and. opens the body up to
opportunistic diseases and infectio'n.
While the. regulations promulgated do. not speak explicitly of the immune
system, one author has concluded that the statutory definition of physical
impairment should not be read narrowly and is not an all inclusive list of physical
impairments. 41 Dementia is also an example of a physical impairment affecting

38

45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.10 (1987).

39

Supra notes 31, 32.

40
See generally Note, AIDS and Employment Discrimination: Should AIDS
be considered a handicap?, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1106 (1987); Note, Does it qualify as
a "Handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 583 (1986).
41
Note, Does it qualify as a "Handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973?, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev .. 583-84 (1986). The declared congressional purpose
behind the Rehabilitation Act suggests that Congress's concern was on providing
equal opportunity for employability to persons with handicaps:
The purpose of this chapter is to develop
and implement,... , and the guarantee of
equal opportunity, ... ,for individuals with
handicaps in order to maximize their
employability, independence, and integration
i,nto the workplace and the community.
29 U.S.C. Sec. 70 I (Supp. IV 1986).
The purpose reflects the intention to
integrate those with handicaps into society. Such a goal supports the view that
the statute should be broadly interpreted and applied.

6

AIDS victims.'2

AIDS victims meet the first criteria of physical or mental

impairment.
The second criteria,that the impairment must be one that "substantial[ly]
limits", is harder to clarify because the regulations do not directly speak to this
issue.'s

The plain language of the regulations show that "substantial limits"

modifies "major life activities."

Because AIDS is a crippling disease and in most

cases causes death, a person with AIDS lacks control over his body's response to
the virus and thus the physical impairment is a substantial limit to a major life
activity (fighting illness).·'
Additionally, AIDS is a substantial limit in the sense
to persons with AIDS.
society.'6

One

~hat

a stigma is attached

The stigma results in isolation and non-participation in

author

has

suggested

that

"substantial

limits"

refers

to

employability and the proper question is to what extent does the impairment
affect employability.'6

Regardless of the manner in which "substantial limits" is

construed, it is clear that one must assess the impact of the, physical impairment
upon one or more major life activities.
"Major, life activities" as suggested by the regulations encompass the ability to
live day to day:47

AIDS makes the victim non-resistant to infection and in need

of constant medical treatment:
normal fashion.
'2

The victim is unable to care for himself in a

Maintenance of good health is one example of a major life

Picot, supra note 13, at 9.
AIDS is a disease of loss, loss of control
of one's body, one's mind, one's life. As
the disease progresses, AIDS victims suffer
not only physical but mental deterioration.
HIV rides into the brain inside the white
blood cells which it infects. In ways which
are still not clear, the presence of the
virus damages the nerve cells of the cerebral
cortex, a center of intellectual function in
human beings. AIDS patients suffer at first
subtle and later more profound decreases in
their intellectual abilities,suffering loss
of memory and other mental functions. Id.

's Note absence from C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3 (1987). '
..
Note, Does it qualify as a "HandiCap" under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973?; 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 584, 584-6
(1986).
"
'
'6 Note, AIDS and Employment Discrimination: Should AIDS be considered a
handicap?, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1106-07 (1987).
'6

Id.

n

Supra note 33.

7

activity."

The progression of the disease can decrease the ability of the AIDS
victim to work from either a physical or mental aspect. 49 Work is a major life
activity as defined in the regulations. 50 The stigma that AIDS victims encounter
also limits their meaningful participation in society (major life activity) in relation
to their family, friends. employers, and co-workers. 51
AIDS victims are individuals with a handicap within the meaning of the Act.
Determination as to whether or not AIDS is an otherwise qualified handicap for
purposes of working must be decided on a case by case basis.

Persons who have

ARC or are members of groups who are perceived to have AIDS (virus carriers.
ARC persons. homosexuals, family and friends of AIDS or ARC victims, etc.) are
handicapped in two ways.

First, the Act's definition of a person with a handicap

indicates that one who "has a record of such an impairment" (history of illness or
misclassification) is a handicapped person within the Act. 52
Regardless of
whether the person has the impairment, the person is treated by others as having
the impairment and thus as an individual with a handicap.63
Secondly, persons who are treated as having AIDS but do not are protected by
the third definition of an individual with a handicap.

The Act provides that

those persons "regarded as having such an impairment" are individuals with a
handicap for purposes of the Act. 54 This protection encompasses those members
48

Supra note 44, at 585-86.

49 Supra notes 13 and 45.
60 Supra note 33.
61 Supra note 44.
62 Supra note 34.
63 Supra note 45. at 1107.
64
45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(iv) (1987). The legislative history to the
Rehabilitation Act Amendments indicates that the definition of a person with a
handicap includes:
those persons who are discriminated against
on the basis of handicap whether or not they
are in fact handicapped..... This subsection
includes within the protection of sections
503 and 504 those persons who do not in fact
have the condition which they are perceived
as having, as well as. those persons whose
mental or physical condition does not substantially limit their life activities and
who thus are not technically within clause
(A) in the new definition. Members of both
these groups may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their being regarded as
handicapped.
S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Congo &
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of

high

risk

groups (ie.

homosexuals),

those

persons who

test

positive

for

antibodies of AIDS, carriers of the virus, persons with ARC, family and friends of
AIDS victims. 55
PART III
Recent decisions of courts in the United States support the position that
victims of AIDS, ARC, or carriers of the virus, or persons perceived as being
infected with AIDS, should be handicapped within the meaning of the Act. 56 In

Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District, the district court held that a child
who was infected with the AIDS virus and showing signs of ARC was an
individual with a handicap and otherwise qualified to attend school for purposes
of application of the Act. 57 The boy, Ryan Thomas, is a child infected with
HTLV-III and was eligible at the time of the case to attend kindergarten class at
a public school that received federal financial assistance. 58

The boy suffered

from pulmonary and middle ear problems and chronic lymphadenopathy.59

These

symptoms indicate a person with ARC.60
The court concluded based upon the medical problems that the boy suffers
from substantial impairment of his major life activities. 61 The court focused on
the transmission of the AIDS virus and held that the disease is not transmitted
through casual contact with a person infected. 62
Therefore, the risk of
transmission is not present in the school context and the school district cannot
Admin. News 6373, 6389-90.
55

Supra notes 44, 45.

56
This paper presents only three of the cases that
and does not intend to cover or speak for all such cases.
57

662 F.Supp. 376 (C.D.Cal. 1987).

58

[d. at 379.

59

[d.

60

V.Gong, supra note 6, at 50-53.

61

662 F.Supp. at 379-380.

62

[d. at 380.

The best available medical evidence shows
that the AIDS virus is not spread in the
air by infected droplets as are the common
cold, influenza and tuberculosis. The virus
is fragile and is killed by most household
disinfectants. The virus is transmitted
from one person to another only by infected
blood, semen, or vaginal fluids (and,
possibly, mother's milk). Transmission
by either semen or blood accounts for virtually all reported cases. [d.
9

address the question

use as the basis of its decision to exclude the boy the mere fact that he has the
AIDS virus and symptoms of ARC. 6S
The court in Thomas relied upon a decision from New York in finding section
504 of the Act applicable to the facts. . In the Matter 0/ District 27 Community

School Board v. City 0/ New York, a seven-year old child was diagnosed as having
AIDS and a review panel cleared his attendance at school. 64 The review panel
concluded that the child should remain in school because he had remained healthy
and had attended school in the previous years.65

Two local community school

boards brought an action seeking an injunction prohibiting the child from
attending school. 66 While the case was at trial, the health commissioner placed
the child's case before a second review panel.

The panel unanimously concluded

that the <tJ!.ild did not meet the CDC's definition of a person with AIDS.67

The

child was classified as being infected with the virus and evidencing some immune
su ppression. 68
The court, recognizing that the issues originally before it were now moot,
proceeded to rule on those issues given the importance and likely recurrence of
such issues and because it was in the public's best interest. 69 Because HTL V -III
attacks and destroys lymphocytes, the court held that children with AIDS suffer
from a physical impairment. 7o The decision further suggests that a person who is
regarded as having an impairment but in reality does not possess the impairment
is protected by the Act.7l

The court then addressed the misdi&gnosis of the boy

and ruled that the Act would apply because the boy's history and misclassification
of having AIDS unjustifiably served as the basis of the exclusion order.72

The

school boards feared the risk of transmission of the disease to non-infected
63

Id. at 382.

64

130 Misc.2d 398,502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1986).

65

[d. at 401, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 328.

66

[d.

67

[d. at 402, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 329.

68

[d.

69

[d. at 402-403, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 329-30.

70

[d. at 414-15, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336.

[d. at 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The court also addressed the equal
7l
protection problem on two levels: 1) excluding those with AIDS but not those
with ARC or carriers of the virus, and 2) excluding those known infected and not
excluding those who are infected but not known. [d. at 414-17, 502 N.Y.S.2d at
337-8.
72

[d. at 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37.

10

individuals.

The court in recognizing the fear indicated that all of the witnesses

for both the school boards and the City of New York concluded that the disease
cannot be spread through casual contact with a person infected. 7s
In School Board oj Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, the United States
Supreme Court was faced with whether a person who had a contagious disease
(tuberculosis) was an individual with a handicap and thus protected by the Act. 74
The Court stated that section 504 was enacted to combat discrimination against
the handicapped. 75 The amendments to the definition of a handicapped person
indicate that Congress intended for the Act to apply to persons who· were
perceived as having a handicap when they in fact did not. 76 This lends support
to the position that those perceived as having AIDS or being infected are
handicapped within the Act.
Arline was a teacher who had experienced recurring episodes of acute
tuberculosis and was released from employment at the end of the 1978-79 school
year because of her potential contagiousness. 77 She suffered from tuberculosis
twice in 1978.78 The Court held that Arline suffered from a record of impairment
which substantially limited her major life activities. 79
Arline's tuberculosis
affected her respiratory system, thereby creating a physiological disorder which
met the criteria of a physical impairment. 8o
Hospitalization to care for the
respiratory impairment was a substantial limitation of her major life activities. 81
The Court held that the effect of tuberculosis upon Arline could not be separated
from the risk of contagiousness to others because both proceeded from the same
condi tion. 82
Section 504 was designed to encompass both the person with the impairment
and his impact on other persons affected by the impairment. 8s Arline was a
7S

[d. at 403-408, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 330-332.

74

107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987).

75

[d. at 1126-27.

76

[d.

77 [d. at 1125.
78

[d.

79

[d. at 1127.

80

[d.

81

[d.

82

[d. at 1128-29.

8S

[d. at 1128.
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person with a record of physical impairment and thus an individual with a
handicap within the meaning of section 504. The fear of contagion on its own as
the basis of the discriminatory action is still not justified in the light of the
Act. 8•

The Court left to the district court the determination of whether Arline

was otherwise qualified to be a teacher within the meaning of section 504. 86
From these cases, the courts will construe victims on the AIDS spectrum as
having a handicap within meaning of the Act.
PART IV
Why consider whether the Act applies to persons with AIDS, ARC, or who are
carriers of the virus, or who are perceived as being infected with AIDS?
of the AIDS epidemic are human beings.

Victims

Just as discrimination on the basis of

age, seX, religion, or ethnicity is not to be tolerated so then discrimination based
upon a handicap should not be tolerated. 86

Persons are justifiably excluded when

a substantial risk to others exists and reasonable accommodation cannot be made
to prevent exposure of others to the infected person.
In the case of AIDS, casual contact in the workplace does not meet the
substantial risk criteria.

The nature of the disease and transmission modes argue

against being infected via casual contact.

Experts overwhelmingly conclude that

the AIDS virus cannot be transmitted through casual contact.

Additionally, AIDS

and ARC victims suffer a physical impairment while those with AIDS, ARC, or the
virus

or

those

Misunderstanding

perceived

as

having

and

of

the

fear

AIDS

unknown

suffer
are

the

stigma
impetus

from

people.

behind

the

discriminatory motives and attitudes. Without an awareness of the disease and its
8.

[d. at 1129.

Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment
would be inconsistent with the basic purpose
of Sec. 504, which is to ensure that handicapped
individuals are not denied jobs or other
benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes
or the ignorance of others. [d.
85

[d. at 1130-31.

86

Washington Post, June 3, 1988, at Al & A14.
Watkins [Chairman of the Presidential
Commission of the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Epidemic] emphasized that he regards civil rights protection as essential
to curbing the spread of AIDS because
"it is the most significant obstacle to
progress," a statement he said was expressed
by dozens of witnesses who recounted
their own experiences of those AIDS
patients with whom they worked. [d.
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modes of transmission, society will isolate and deny AIDS victims the chance for
meaningful participation in society.
CONCLUSION
One avenue of protection for persons with AIDS, ARC, HTLV-III or who are
perceived as having AIDS is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Section 504 prevents
discrimination

against

otherwise

qualified

receiving federal financial assistance.

handicapped

persons

in

programs

Statutory analysis and case law suggests

that those persons are handicapped within the meaning of the statute.

This is

just one avenue of protection against discrimination in the workplace.

Without

avenues of protection for individuals with AIDS, ARC, or the virus or protection
for

those

perceived

to

have

AIDS,

discriminatory

attitudes

fueled

by

misinformation, myths, and fear will deny those persons employment opportunities
and meaningful participation in society.
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ENFORCEMENT OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISIONS
IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS IN CASES OF MUTUAL DELAY
BY OWNERS AND CONTRACTORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Gyms, Inc., a hypothetical Virginia construction company, contracts with a
local government to build a public gymnasium.

Pursuant to the contract, Gyms is

to construct the facility and to install all wall mats, basketball hoops, gym bars,
game clocks and other necessary equipment. Gyms also assuines responsibility for
landscaping of the facility, pa~ing of an auxiliary parking lot, and other jobs
related to construction of the facility, but which are not absolutely necessary for
its opening.

The parties execute a ISO-page contract which, along with its other

provisions, states that time is of the essence and provides for liquidated damages
to be asS'essed for each day completion is delayed beyond a specified date.

Work

is commenced by Gyms upon receipt of an order to proceed, and four' months
later, on the specified completion date, the finished facility is turned over to the
government owner. A typical situation? Not at all.
Even a hypothetical owner and contractor are likely to be subjected to delays
caused by inclement weather, unavailability of supplies, scheduling difficulties, and
a number of other potential complications.

When the owner is solely responsible

for the delay, the contractor will usually seek an extension for completion.

It

may also recover financial losses resulting from any unreasonable delay on the
part of the owner in court. 1

If the delay is instead caused by the contractor or

its agents, the government will assess liquidated damages for each day's delay.
Yet in this hypothetical, as is often the case in reality, both parties have
contributed to the delay in completion.

The government's delay is in providing

the game clocks, which can be installed in one day but must be in place for the
facility to host basketball games.

Gyms, while waiting for the clocks, proceeds

with the paving and landscaping for 60 days past the completion date, at which
time the clocks arrive and are installed.
Should the government be allowed to enforce its contractual remedy for
damages due to the delay in completion of landscaping and paving, or ,should the
time provision of the contract be nullified?

If the time provision of the contract

is negated, should Gyms be allowed a reasonable amount of time to complete its
work on the clocks following the government's delay, leaving the government to
prove actual damages for any recovery it seeks?

More specifically, this article

will discuss whether the local government can recover anything when both parties
are at fault and when the delay of a contractor such as Gyms, though sizeable

1
Atlantic Coast Line R. v. A. M Walkup Co., Inc., 132 Va. 386, 390, 112
S.E. 663, 664 (1922).
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when compared with the government's, did not prevent the facility from opening
and thus caused no actual damages.
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
In construction contracts, a provision granting liquidated damages for each
day's delay is an appropriate means of inducing performance or of providing
compensation when either party fails to perform. 2

Parties may properly contract

for such a provision when actual damages at the time of the agreement are
uncertain and difficult to measure.
damage~.

The courts will enforce the provision unless

at the time of breach are susceptible of definite measurement (as in

breach of an agreement to pay money) or when the stipulated amount would be
grossly in excess of actual damages.

As in any type of contract, the focus is on

the intent of the parties as evidenced by the entire contract, and by t~e
As long as the amount
circumstances under which the contract was made. s
designated as liquidated damages is a reasonable expression of the parties' intent
at the time of the contract, the fact that no. actual damages are ultimately
suffered by the contractee is irrelevant:'
Construction contracts such as that between the hypothetical parties above are
precisely the types of contracts where liquidated damages provisions are best
used.

Given the number and variety of duties assigned to the contractor,

potential actual damages are incapable of being precisely ascertained at the time
the contract is made.

The liquidated damages provision, by setting a fixed rate

of compensation, serves as an estimate of damages which would be sustained by
the owner regardless of the nature of a delay, rather than as a means of
compensating for the breach of a particular component of the contract.
Viewed in this light, a provision allowing the withholding of an amount which
is not disproportionate to the probable (rather. than actual) loss due to a
contractor's delay will not be construed as an invalid penalty and is enforceable
as liquidated damages. 5

Where, however, the contractor's delay is not the sole

delay, an amount that wouJd ordinarily be considered an appropriate measure of
damages may be deemed unacceptable.

2

Robinson v. United States, 261 U.S. 486, 488 (1923).

S

Taylor v. Sanders, 233 Va. 73, 75, 353 S.E.2d 745, 746-47 (1987).
Although this is a real estate case, the real estate and construction industries are
similar in this respect.
4

See Robinson v. United States, 261 U.S. at 488.

5

Taylor v. Sanders, 233 Va. at 76, 353 S.E.2d at 747.
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MAJORITY VIEW: THE ROLE OF NONAPPORTIONMENT
There are two lines of opinion on the issue of whether a liquidated damages
provision may be enforced when both the owner and the contractor contribute to
a delay in construction.

Under the majority view, an owner who has caused a

substantial delay in the beginning or progress of work without agreeing to an
extension is prohibited from claiming liquidated damages, even if the contractor is
also responsible for the delay.6
In United States v. United Engineering & Contracting Co. 7, a contractor who
had accepted a reduced payment under protest was able to recover liquidated
damages withheld by the government after showing that much of the delay in its
construction of a building had been caused by delays in the completion of

.

surrounding buildings by other contractors hired by the government.

The court

-

refused to apportion the owner's and contractor's delay and held that since the
government had prevented performance of the contract within the stipulated time,
even though the work was also delayed through the fault of the contractor,
liquidated damages were waived, and the government could recover only proven
actual damages. 8
The following language of the court's opinion states the oft-quoted "rule of
nonapportionment" now applied by many states and lower federal courts:

"

We think the better rule is that when the contractor has agreed to do a piece
of work within a given time and the parties have stipulated a fixed sum as
liquidated damages not wholly disproportionate to the loss for each day's delay,
in order to enforce such payment the other party must not prevent the
performance of the contract within the stipulated time, and that where such is
the case, and thereafter the work is completed though delayed by the fault of
the contractor, the rule of the original contract cannot be insisted upon, and
liquidated damages measured thereby are waived. 9
In adopting this rule, the court was influenced by the fact that supplemental
agreements between the government and United Engineering during the course of
construction made no reference to liquidated damages. lO

Some lower courts have

interpreted the rule more broadly on the theory that the parties' mutual delays
place the date of completion beyond the term of the contract. Because courts
must be able to fix the day from which a liquidated damages clause is to apply, it
6

Annotation, Liability of Building or Construction
Liquidated Damages for Breach of Time Limit Where Work
Contractee or Third Person, 152 A.L.R. 1349, 1359-60 (1944).
7

234 U.S. 236 (1914).

8

[d. at 242.

9

[d.

10.

[d.
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Contractor for
is Delayed by

is claimed, apportionment cannot be made where no definite date for completion
remains. l l In any event, the owner is again relegated to proving actual damages.
THE MINORITY VIEW: APPORTIONMENT ALLOWED
Where a contract contains an explicit time extension provision, most courts
will assume that the parties intended an apportionment of responsibility for delay
to be made, and will allow the owner to recover a liquidated sum for the period
of delay attributable to the contractor. 12 Under the minority view, apportionment
is permitted even where no contractual provision for time extensions has been
made.

A delay caused by the owner does not necessarily discharge the forfeiture

clause but only entitles the contractor to a credit against his period of default
(in a sense, an automatic extension).13
The primary authority for the rule permitting apportionment is Robinson v.

United States. 1"

In Robinson, the contractor, relying on United Engineering,

argued that because the government had caused some of the delay in construction,
the

liquidated

damages

provision

was

unenforceable.

The court,

however,

distinguished United Engineering, in stating that, but for the government's action
in that case, the contractor's work would have been completed within the
contract period. 16 Because the contractor in Robinson had agreed to pay at a
specified rate for each day's delay not caused by the government, the court found
that a clear intent was shown for the contractor to pay for some days' delay,
even if relieved from paying for other delays because of the government's action.
As a result, the government did recover liquidated damages for the days of delay
attributable to the contractor. 16
APPORTIONMENT/NONAPPORTIONMENT IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
In

the

Fourth Circuit, case law

nonapportionment.

both supports and

limits

the

rule

of

Because the circuit's mutual delay decisions were all made

prior to United Engineering and Robinson, it is unclear how these later cases may
have affected the state of the law in Virginia.

11

In Jefferson Hotel Co. v.

Annotation. supra note 6, at 1364-65.

12
Cushman, Ficken & Sneed, Delays and Disruptions, in CONSTRUCTION
LITIGATION 123 (R. Cushman ed. 1981).

13

Annotation, supra note 6, at 1369.

14

261 U.S. 486 (1923).

16

[d. at 489.

16

[d. at 488.

17

Brumbaugh,17 the court did not require a general contractor to pay a contract

penalty of $150 per day of delay beca use
owner had contributed to the delay.

indepe~den t

con tractors hired by the

Though the hotel company urged that its

contractors had only been responsible fora few days' delay, the court refused to
apportion their delay with that of the general contractor.

The court held that

the general contractor, as a builder, was entitled to work in an undisturbed,
systematic manner and that the court· could not know, months later, what
conditions had contributed to the overall delay, so it would not attempt to
apportion the delay.ls
In Caldwell & Drake v.· Schmulbach,19 a case decided shortly after Jefferson
Hotel, the court, relying on that decision, refused to apportion the delay between

an owner

~nd

apportionment.

contractor, even though the parties' contract expressly provided for
The causes of delay in construction of a building included

difficulty of access to the construction site, which was hemmed in by surrounding
buildings, necessity of protecting the buildings adjoining the site, and most
notably, a set of architectural plans which provided for a building larger than the
lot

on

which

it

was

to

be

constructed.

According

to

the

court,

these

circumstances demonstrated clearly the impossibility of a court's attempting to
determine and apportion the cause of de<lay between an owner and contractor
when both were in default.

Consequently, no private contract by its terms could

change the law prohibiting apportionment or could compel a court to do so.20
Jefferson Hotel and Caldwell & Drake appear to indicate a general adherence

to the rule of nonapportionment in the fourth circuit.
currently referenced as authority supporting that rUle.21

Indeed, both cases are
The decision in Caldwell

& Drake, however, was modified on appeal in Schmulbach v. Caldwell,22 where,

rather than focusing on the difficulties a court might have in apportioning mutual
delay, the court emphasized the parties' agreement that the contractor would pay
$50 per day in liquidated damages for delays not caused by inclement weather or
the owner.

The court distinguished Jefferson Hotel. where the payment for each

day's delay was designated in the contract as a penalty, stating that. where
parties had provided for a stipulated sum as liquidated damages, courts should
17

168 F. 867 (4th Cir. 1909).

IS

[d. at 874-75.

19

175 F. 429 (C.C.N.D. W.Va. 1909).

20

[d. at 434.

21

See 17A c.J.S. Contracts Sec. 502(4)(a) (1963).

22

196 F. 16, 28 (4th Cir. 1912).
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give effect to their intent by not holding the amount to be a penalty or refusing
to enforce the contract provision. 23
In further attempting to distinguish Jefferson Hotel, the court pointed out that
whereas the cour.t in Jefferson Hotel had found it impossible to separate mutual
delays, here the parties had provided for a means of apportionment in the
contract. Regarding this issue, the court said:
[W]e are not aware of any principle of law, which prevents or relieves the
court from apportioning the delays when, either by competent and satisfactory
evidence, or by a contractual standard fixed by the parties, they can do so
with reasonable certainty.24 (emphasis added).
Because the owner could show the number of days for which he was entitled
to liquidated damages and could point to a contract requiring the defaulting party
to share the number of

days for
nonapportionment was inapplicable. 26

which he was entitled

to be

credited,

The contractual language in Schmulbach (providing the contractor with a credit
for days "when the weather forbids work" and "for each. and every day he is
delayed by the owner")26 makes that agreement closely analogous to contracts
explicitly providing for time extensions, which do not come under the rule of
non apportionment.
evidence

However, based on the court's reference to consideration of

establishing

contractual

standard),

responsibility
it

would

for
seem

delay
that

(as

opposed

whenever

the

to

the

parties'

impossibility

of

apportioning delay is not at issue (either because the parties have provided a
means of apportionment, as in Schmulbach, or because the delays attributable to
each party are easily separated, as in the Gyms hypothetical), it would not be
inherently unfair for a court to apply a forfeiture clause, stipulated in advance by
the parties, to the contractor's portion of the delay.27
Coal & Iron Ry. v. Reherd 28 indicates still another circumstance under which a

Fourth Circuit court may be willing to allow apportionment.

In Reherd, though

the parties' contract did not expressly provide for a time extension where the
owner's actions interfered with timely completion, the court found that because
the contract conferred on the owner the authority to require additional work by
23

Id. at 25-26.

24

[d. at 27.

26

[d.

26

[d. at 18.

27 [d. at 27.
28 204 F. 859 (4th Cir. 1913).
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the

contractor,

the parties' consent to a

reasonable extension of

time for

completing the extra work could be implied. 29
Under the implied extension rationale, fault for any delay beyond the
reasonable period necessary to complete the extra work was attributed to the
contractor.

The court held that though the owner had increased the work, which

would necessarily require more time, when a reasonable time had elapsed for the
contractor to complete the increased work, it would be liable in liquidated
damages for delays beyond that reasonable limit of time. so Thus, relying on its
interpretation of the parties' agreement and intent, the court allowed enforcement
of the forfeiture clause, even though specific provision for time extensions had
not been made and the owner's actions had contributed to the delay.
COMPETING POLICIES
Though the more recent decision of Robinson v. United States can be read as
limiting the instances in which a court refuses to apportion damages to situations
such as that in United States v. United Engineering & Contracting Co. (where the
contractor would have completed construction as scheduled had the owner's agents
not caused an intervening delay), many courts continue to adhere to a general
rule of nonapportionment.

The policies that support the rule involved arise from

unique aspects of the construction industry.

Delay in one part of construction

usually disturbs the whole, the length of an interruption does not necessarily
correspond to the resulting delay, and complicated evidence makes it difficult to
separate

the

delays

attributable

to

each

party.Sl

The

certainty,

apparent

evenhanded treatment of owner and contractor, and ease of application of the
nonapportionment rule make it attractive from an administrative point of view. s2
Nevertheless, the practical effect of a refusal to apportion delay, granting the
contractor an extension of time for completion but denying him any monetary
recovery for the delay, while at the same time precluding the owner from
collecting liquidated damages for late completion, may result in injustice to both
parties. ss

If the government in the Gyms hypothetical had failed to inspect the

building for two months, which in turn prevented the contractor from proceeding
with additional phases in the construction process, Gyms, though perhaps grateful
for an exemption from paying liquidated damages for any delay on its part, might
29

[d. at 880.

so

!d. at 881.

SI

Annotation, supra note 6, at 1376-77.

S2
Phillips, Stetson, Bramble, Construction Disputes and Time, in ISSUES
IN CONSTRUCTION LAW 49, 65 (1988).
SS. [d.

20

find that exemption wholly disproportionate to its losses over the two-month
waiting period.
A better solution would be to grant Gyms an implied extension and to allow it
to present a claim for "extra work" as in Coal & Iron Ry. v. Reherd.

On the

other hand, if, as in the original hypothetical, Gyms were responsible for two
months' delay in performing one part of the contract (the landscaping and
paving), while the government defaulted with respect to a part of the contract
which in no way affected Gyms' ability to landscape and pave, which required
only one half day's work, and which, had Gyms not also been in default, would
probably have been excused altogether,S4 it would be unfair to allow Gyms to
capitalize on the government's inability to obtain clocks by refusing to uphold the
forfeiture clause.
In addition to the equitable considerations supporting apportionment, there are
practical reasons for allowing the parties' contractual provisions for damages to
stand.

First, improvements in methods of scheduling analysis and the detail of

critical path management have made allocation of responsibility for delay less
difficult than it may have been when the rule against apport
ionment was being developed. 55 An increased faith in the ability of triers of fact
to sort out complicated evidence also weighs in favor of allocation.
Finally, there is the liquidated damages provision itself.

In the Gyms

hypothetical, the parties, at the time the contract was made, agreed to a
liquidated sum as a measure of potential actual damages which could not otherwise
be ascertained.

Though the rationale behind the refusal of many courts to

enforce liquidated damages provisions in cases of mutual delay may be that such
provisions act as a penalty,56 the fact remains that if a claim is for measured or
liquidated damages expressly agreed upon by the parties to be compensation for
potential actual damages, the principles involved regarding the enforcement of
penalties do not apply.57
It would be inconsistent for a court to rule that an owner who has contributed

to construction delay is allowed to recover actual damages, only to ignore the
owner's

(and

contractor's)

provision

for

those

damages.

Today,

when

construction contracts cover hundreds of facets of a given project, are thoroughly
negotiated by both sides, and are deliberately designed to protect both owner and
54 Reid v. Field, 83 Va. 26, I S.E. 395 (1887). A contractee is entitled to
accept less than full performance, and the government would have done so itt the
interests of avoiding unnecessary expense.
55

Phillips, Stetson, Bramble, supra note 32, at 66.

36

Annotation, supra note 6, at 1378.

37

Schmulbach v. Caldwell, 196 F. 16,25-26 (4th Cir. 1912).
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contractor from unpredictable events, there is no reason to sacrifice the parties'
freedom to address problems of mutual delay in the interests of judicial economy
and adherence to an archaic rule of law.

22

RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS V. LIPSCOMB:
TIGHTENING THE GRIP ON VIRGINIA PUBLISHERS
The United States Supreme Court recently declined to hear an appeal of a 1987
Virginia Supreme Court case which held that a public school teacher is not a
public official for the purpose of invoking the New York Times malice rule l in
defamation cases.

In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, the Virginia court

said the public has no independent interest in Lipscomb's qualifications and
performance "beyond its general interest in the qualifications and performance of
all government employees," and therefore she was not a public official but rather
a private person. 2
The court noted the lack of any federal case on the question, and a split in
the state court holdings.
official.

Federal constitutional law determines who is a public

State courts must determine public official status in accordance with

"the purpose of a national constitutional protection," and therefore state law tests
are not determinative on the question. s
This. article analyzes the court's finding in Lipscomb that a public school
teacher is not a public officiaL It also compares Lipscomb with other federal and
state court decisions on the public official question.

The article illustrates that

this part of the Lipscomb decision missed the key components of the test for
public official status, such as the breadth of the leading definition of a public
official, the impact of public education on government, and the access a teacher
has to media remedies.
F ACTS OF LIPSCOMB

Lipscomb centered around a newspaper article written for the Richmond TimesDispatch by Charles Cox.

In a front-page article published a few weeks before

the start of school in the fall of 1981, Cox questioned the qualifications of
1
A suit for defamation provides an avenue of legal r~dress for invasions
of an individual's interest in reputation and good name. To recover damages a
plaintiff must prove the defamatory comments injured his reputation and impaired
his standing among his peers. Thus an essential consideration in any defamation
action is the status of the plaintiff. Whether a court deems a person to be a
private individual or a public figure is of paramount importance in such actions
because public figures alleging defamation must prove the defendant published
the defamatory comments with actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth.
Private individuals carry no such onerous burden. Note, Waldbaum v. Fairchild
Publications, Inc.: Giving Objectivity to the Definition of Public Figures, 30
Cath.U.L.Rev. 307, 308 (1981).

2
234 Va. 277, 287, 362 S.E.2d 32, 37 (1987) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966», cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1997 (1988).
S
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966). The case held that a
supervisor of a ski resort who was employed by and directly responsible to county
commissioners was a public official for purposes of federal constitutional
protection purposes.
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Vernelle Lipscomb, a teacher at Thomas Jefferson High School in Richmond. The
article included quotes from Lipscomb's colleagues, students and parents of
students criticizing Lipscomb's teaching abilities, particularly when dealing with
bright or honors program students. Cox was alerted to the problem by a parent of
one of Lipscomb's students.

The parent had previously approached the school

administration and attempted to have Lipscomb removed.

When this failed the

parent contacted Cox and told him about the situation.

At the time, no open

conflict existed at the high school, but numerous complaints were on record
regarding Lipscomb.

The front-page article provided very little refutation of the

negative statements.

Lipscomb and other school officials had been contacted for

comment, but the school board attorney advised them against discussing the
details of the complaint against the teacher.
presented

at

the

ensuing

defamation

Conflicting lines of testimony were
trial

with

regard

to

Lipscomb's

qualifications. 4
Prior to Lipscomb, the Supreme Court of Virginia had held that a university
professor does not occupy a position of such persuasive power and influence that
he could be deemed a public figure for all purposes. 5

In Lipscomb, the court

broadened the scope of the state's defamation remedy by ruling that a teacher is
not a public official, leaving designation as a "limited purpose" or "vortex" public
figure 6 the only way in which an educator could qualify for New York Times
actual malice. 7
4
Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 283. Lipscomb sued the newspaper, the publisher
and the reporter, and was awarded $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and
$45,000 in punitive damages by a jury. The trial judge sustained the jury's award
of $45,000 in punitive damages but required a remittitur of $900,000 of the
compensatory damages. Id.

5
Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981). Moore took out
an advertisement in a local newspaper that accused Fleming of being a racist.
Moore was a realtor and his actions were in reference to some property
development that Fleming had invested in. The court said the words probably did
not have an effect on Fleming in his profession as a teacher, and thus were not
defamatory per se.
6
A limited purpose or "vortex" public figure is far more common than the
"general purpose" public figure. The designation is comprised of those individuals
who voluntarily inject themselves into a particular public controversy and thereby
assume a role of special prominence in the affairs of society and therefore invite
attention and comment. Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).

7. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Times published
an advertisement that was challenged as maliciously defamatory of a city
commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the
statements in the advertisement were libelous per se, false, and not privileged,
and that the evidence showed malice on the part of the newspaper. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that there was a qualified privilege for honest misstatements
of fact, defeasible only upon a showing of actual malice.
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The court disposed of the public official Question summarily, relying on the

Gertz 8 arguments to conclude that a public school teacher is not a public official.
The court, citing Gertz, reasoned that a teacher does not have access to channels
of effective communication and hence does not have an opportunity to counteract
potentially false or defamatory statements, thus making a teacher more like a
private citizen than a public official and more in need of government protection. 9
The court cited the Virginia Code,tO which prohibits disclosing student names and
records, as one barrier to effective communication.
Following the reasoning of Gertz, one part of the test for a public official is
whether, in view of his employment position, an official ran "the risk of closer
public scrutiny" than might otherwise be the case. 11

The court acknowledged this

was true for a public school teacher, but felt this point did not outweigh the
other factors in the final decision.

Particularly influential to the court's decision

was Lipscomb's lack of access to channels of effective communication and the
lack of a controversy at the time the newspaper article was published.
The court found that the criticism of Lipscomb came as a result of her
performance as a teacher, not as temporary head of Jefferson High School's
English department. She did not attempt to influence or control any public affair
or school policy.

The court focused on the question of whether her position as a

schoolteacher was one that would invite public scrutiny and public discussion. 12
Finally, the Times-Dispatch article was one that created a controversy rather than
reported on one that already existed.

The employee's position was not inviting

8
Gertz concerned a libelous article appearing in a magazine called
American Opinion, a monthly publication of the John Birch Society. The article
in question discussed whether the prosecution of a policeman in Chicago was part
of a communist campaign to discredit local law enforcement agencies.
The
magazine alleged that Gertz was the chief architect of the "frame-up" of the
police officer and linked him to Communist activity. Gertz was working for the
plaintiff in a related civil suit. The Supreme Court held he was neither a public
official nor a public figure. The court rejected the defendant's "de facto" public
official argument and decided the question based on the attorney's lack of access
to effective reply in the media. The court also based its decision on Gertz'
failure to thrust himself into the vortex of any public issue or to seek the
limelight in any meaningful way.
9

Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 285, 362 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at

418).
to

Va. Code Sec. 22.1-287(A) provides in pertinent part:
"No teacher, principal or employee of any public school nor any school
board member shall permit access to any written records concerning any particular
pupil enrolled in the school in any class to any person except under judicial
process .... "

11

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.

12

Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87 n.13.
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public scrutiny and discussion, but rather because discussion was occasioned by
the

particular

charges

against

Lipscomb,

public

official

designation

was

inappropriate. IS
BACKGROUND DECISIONS
In

New

York

Times Co. v. Sullivan,14 the United States Supreme Court

introduced the concept of the public official whose privacy interest would have to
partially yield to the public interest to further free and open debate on issues of
general public concern.

Under the Times standard, public criticism of a public

official's public conduct is constitutionally protected from defamation liability
absent clear and convincing proof 16 that the defendant acted with "actual
malice."16
In New York Times, the Supreme Court intentionally left the boundaries of
what constitutes a "public official" an open question. 17
Court

again

addressed

the

question

in

Rosenblatt

v.

Two years later the
Baer.18

The

Court

established that persons in either of the following two situations could fit the
public official definition, thus triggering the New York Times malice standard:
(I) "... at the very least ... those among the hierarchy of government

employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental
affairs." or
(2) "Where a position in government has such apparent importance
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications
and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications
and performance of all government employees ... ."19
The Rosenblatt decision determined that the focus must be on the nature of
the public employee's function and the public's particular concern with the
employee's work.

The case, however, did not provide a clear demarcation between

public officials and mere public employees. The Court again left unclear to which
government employees the public official designation extended.
IS

Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 287, 362 S.E.2d at 37 (citing Gertz, 383 U.S. at 87

n.13).
14

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

16

[d. at 285-86.

16

[d. at 279-80.

17 The Court had no occasion "to determine how far down into the lower
ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would extend ... " [d.
at 283 n.23.
18

383 U.S. 75 (1966).

19

[d. at 85, 86.

26

In 1967, the Supreme Court said that public figures would also be subject to
the New York Times malice rule. 20 Like the public official, the public figure
"... commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to the
means of counterargument to be able to 'expose through discussion the falsehoods
and fallacies'"21 voiced against him or her.
achieved

through

the

status

of

one's

A public figure designation could be

position

in

society, or

by "thrusting

... [oneself] into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy ... ."22
The expansion of First Amendment protection under the public official and
public figure doctrines reached its peak in 1971 with Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.

lnc. 23

A plurali ty24 of the Supreme Court said that regardless of whether the

plaintiff was a public or private citizen, his involvement in a matter of public or
general concern was sufficient to trigger the New York Times knowing and
reckless falsity standard for defamation.

Two years later in Gertz, the Supreme

Court began to withdraw some of these First Amendment freedoms by narrowing
the working definition of a public official.

Rather than focusing solely on the

question of whether the matter exposed to media attention was a valid public
concern as New York Times and· Rosenblatt did, the Gertz decision said that
public official decisions had to balance this First Amendment concern against the
privacy interests of the individual, and the individual's ability to respond to false
or misleading statements made about them.

In the opinion of the Court, "[t]he

'public or general interest' test for determining the applicability of the New York
Times standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of the
competing values at stake."25
The law as it stands today allows room for both the Gertz and Rosenblatt
rationales.

While in Hutchinson v. Proxmire 26 the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated

its movement away from the pure "responsibility or control over government
20

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

21
ld. at 155 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting».

22

ld.

23

403 U.S. 29 (1971)

24 Justice Brennan wrote the plurality oplDlon joined by Burger and
Blackmun. Justices Black and White each wrote a separate concurrence. Justice
Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Marshall which was joined by
Justice Stewart. Justice Douglas did not take part in the decision.
25

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.

26

443 U.S. III (1979).

27

affairs"27 test, in Virginia, "the Rosenblatt characterization of a New York Times
public official has not been modified and in our view fits well into the framework
of competing values created by libel litigation."28
VIRGINIA
In Lipscomb, the Supreme Court of Virginia focused primarily on the self-help
doctrine:

the idea that society will allow more potentially damaging discussion

about public officials in part because of their enhanced ability to contradict lies
or correct errors by their greater access to the media.

The conclusion that

Lipscomb did not have access to the media is contrary to the facts of the case.
If Lipscomb's professional conduct as a schoolteacher was noteworthy enough to

be published on the front page of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, the teacher had
viable

ac~ess

to that medium. The court in Lipscomb is primarily concerned that

the avenue for expression be a two-way street, yet the underlying facts show that
this

was

the

case.

Because

the

institution

scrutinized, media interest is assured.

of

public education

is

being

For instance, had Lipscomb made a

statement that her students were exceptionally belligerent, or made any other
reference to her job which indicated that things were out of the ordinary, that
would have been "news" also, and would have merited coverage in the newspaper.
The Virginia Supreme Court also reasoned that Lipscomb was barred from
effectively replying to criticism because of a statute in the Virginia Code. 29 The
court assumes that if Lipscomb were to defend her teaching reputation, she would
need to disclose official records of students in her class, an act forbidden under
the Code.

There are three problems with this reasoning.

options existed for Lipscomb to defend herself.

First, equally effective

At the trial there were students,

teachers and school administrators who testified in contradiction of the complaints
about Lipscomb,so so certainly there were reliable people available whom Lipscomb
could have referred Cox to in order to contradict the defamatory statements Cox
had recorded.
Secondly, the Virginia court misapplied the test for a public official.

They

focused on the individual circumstances of Lipscomb's case, and not the position
of school teachers in general.

When deciding whether a person is a public figure

it is appropriate to delve into the particular circumstances surrounding the alleged
defamatory statements.

However, when deciding whether a person is a public

official, the court should look at the employment position in a generic sense, and
27

Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. 75 at 85-86.

28 Arctic Co., Ltd., v. Loudoun Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518, 521 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
29

See supra, note 10.

so

Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 283, 362 S.E.2d at 35.
28

not add in factors such as Lipscomb's ability to respond to specific charges.A
person seeking government office "runs the risk of closer public scrutiny."31

It

is self evident that a person whose job entails trying to influence scores of young
men and women on a daily basis is going to be scrutinized by those persons, their
families and their peers.
Perhaps the strongest refutation of this "inhibited access" theory adopted by
the Virginia Supreme Court in Lipscomb comes from an earlier Virginia case,

Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, in which the U.S. Supreme Court, on
appeal from the Virginia Supreme Court, said the fact that judges traditionally do
not respond to media reports and public commentary did not give them any
greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions. 32
The Supreme Court of Virginia mentions the fact that Lipscomb was not an
elected official. This should not have had any bearing on the outcome of the
question. 33 The general public's right to vote for the official is dispositive of
neither of the two criteria from Rosenblatt, apparent importance in government
and heightened interest in job performance. 34 Appointed officials ranging from the
executive cabinet to police officers 3s fit comfortably in the Rosenblatt definition
of a public official. This is an example of the court's application of public figure
reasoning to a public official question.
The determinative question in the public figure analysis is whether the person
makes a conscious effort to seek out the limelight. A person campaigning for 36
31

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.

32
435 U.S. 829, 838-9 (1978). Landmark focused on a Virginia statute
which enacted criminal sanctions against any person publishing information about
proceedings before a state judicial review commission hearing complaints about
judges' disabilities or misconduct. The U.S. Supreme Court said that in general
the operation of the judiciary, and in specific the conduct of judges, is a matter
of utmost public concern.
This analysis leads to a similar conclusion that
complaints about a teacher's qualifications necessarily are a matter of public
concern and protected speech because they have a direct bearing on the operation
of public education.
33
"There has been no showing that Lipscomb, who was not an elected
officiaL." Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 286, 362 S.E.2d at 37.
34

383 U.S. at 85-86.

3S
See True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462
So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984). Both of these courts rejected the public school teacher as
a public official in part by distinguishing the position from a police officer. Both
states have held a police officer to be a public official.
36. For an example of the New York Times malice rule applied to the higher
strata of elected officialdom, see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971)
(candidate for democratic nomination for U.S. Senate), and at the lower end of
the spectrum, Ocala Star Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (candidate for
29

or holding an elected office would obviously be striving to stay in the public eye.
A public official does not necessarily have the same motivations.

The court errS

by asking how Lipscomb obtained her position of authority.
The proper controlling question is whether the public acknowledges the job the
Under

official holds to be authoritative or influential.

Gertz,

public

funding is relevant in deciding whether a government employee is a public
official.

Lipscomb did not mention the fact that the public school teacher was on

the public payroll.

While the question of whether an official receives public

funds is not dispositive,S7 there is merit to the view that a threshold question to
show public official status should be whether the position comes under the ambit
of a government institution. s8
ANALYSIS BY OTHER COURTS

•

As the Supreme Court of Virginia noted, there is a decided split in the state
court holdings on this question.

Other state courts have looked at the question

in greater detail than did the Virginia court.

Generally the courts that extend

the public official doctrine to public school teachers rely on Rosenblatt (public
debate should take precedence over privacy interest), while courts holding a
teacher is not a public official emphasize the Gertz premise that privacy of the
individual is superior.

In the two decades since Rosenblatt, several cases have

limited the scope of the public official doctrine, however.39
The Supreme Court of Virginia did not value a teacher's impact on society as
highly as the state cases coming to an opposite conclusion on the public official
question.

There is substantial sociological data affirming the impact of the

schoolteacher on the citizenry.40

In Gallman v. Carnes,41 the Arkansas Supreme

county tax assessor}.
37 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. III (1979).
38

Johnston v. Corinthian City Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978).

39
See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 119 n.8. The Supreme
Court "has not provided precise boundaries for the category of 'public official'; it
cannot be thought to include all public employees, however."; and Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).

40
Brennan noted the Court's repeated reference to public schools as "the
Nation's most important institution in the preparation of individuals for
participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our
society rests."
Brennan said the teacher plays a critical role in developing
students' attitude toward government and understanding of the role of citizens in
our society, and serves as a role model for students. See, e.g., Note, Aliens'
Right to Teach: Political Socialization and Public Schools, 85 YALE L. J. 90, 99104 (I975). "With the family and the peer group, the school is recognized as a
crucial agent of political socialization. A teacher's role in the process of political
and cultural learning becomes critical because a teacher is quite often the first
nonfamilial spokesman of society that a child regularly encounters, and functions
30

Court said newspaper articles could question the qualifications of a law school
professor because education is a matter of general or public concern.
Arkansas holding is in direct. conflict with

Lipscomb.

The

There is little to

distinguish the case from Lipscomb other than the fact that the courts came to
opposite conclusions.
In drawing the distinction that a teacher has very limited authorit y 42 the
courts again emphasize the "control" aspect of the definition and overlook the
"substantial responsibility" part of the definition.

A review of the language used

by the courts that espouse this reasoning reveals an underlying premise that to
meet the definition of public official a government employee must have the ability
to assert direct, tangible control over the citizenry.43
case.

This is simply not the

A public official may be one who appears to have substantial responsibility

for the conduct of government as well as private affairs.44
DECISIONS CONTRARY TO LIPSCOMB
State courts have mentioned a number of factors in holding a teacher to be a
public official.

In Gallman, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a facuIty
dispute at a public institution was a matter of general public concern. 46 Other
in the classroom as Ii model for acceptable behavior and social attitudes." [d. at
102-3 and "The public school teacher as an authority figure .. .is much more like a
political authority ... The teacher, like the policeman, president, or mayor, is part
of an institutional pattern, a constitutional order." [d. at 103 n.52 (quoting R.
Dawson and K. Prewitt, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (1969) at 158).
41. 497 S.W.2d 47 (Ark. 1973). The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a
law school professor was a public official for purposes of a news article that
questioned his teaching abilities. The court said that a faculty dispute over the
teacher's qualifications was properly an issue for public comment and therefore
privileged. [d.' at 50 (quoting Clark v. McBane, 299 Mo. 77, 252 S.W.428 (1923».
The court quoted Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (I 971), which
extended the "constitutional protection to all discussion and communication
involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to wh,ether the
persons involved are famous or anonymous." [d.
.
42

True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d at 264.

43
See, e.g., True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986) and Nodar v.
Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
44 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 85-86.
46
497 S.W.2d at 50.
Interestingly, the Arkansas court noted that the
Supreme Court of Virginia had recently upheld a summary judgment' in recognizing
that a faculty dispute at a state college constituted a subject of public and
general concern. The Virginia case involved a faculty dispute at Virginia Western
Community College. The Virginia court based its "public official" decision on the
fact that there was open dispute between facuIty and administrators, rather than
the general question of whether the position of college professor fit the public
official definition, and the case is therefore not applicable to the present
question.
31

relevant factors for some courts included the closeness of the teaching position to
the electoral process,·6 and whether the position was publicly funded.· 7

Another

court has found that even a voluntary teaching position can qualify for public
official status.·a The most prevalent rationale used by courts when holding a
teacher

to

be

a

public

official

is

to

emphasize

the

social

and

political

responsibilities incumbent upon the position in the community.·9

.6 In Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (1978), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that a teacher must show actual malice under New York
Times and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. The court was persuaded by an Illinois
case, Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 III.App.3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (1974), later
overruled in its state of origin by McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 III. App.3d 421, 54
IlI.Dec. 913, 425 N.E.2d 1130 (1981).
Basarich found it relevant that public school teachers were hired by the school
board, an elected body, and were paid with public funds. Also, the court said the
teaching occupation is a highly responsible position in the community and thus fit
the Rosenblatt criteria for public official status.

U

Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (1978) .

•a
Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla.1978)
involved a grade school physical education teacher and wrestling coach. The fact
that Johnston was not paid for his work as a coach was not relevant, according
to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, because Johnston was still working within the
public school system, an obvious governmental function .
• 9 Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986). The
court borrowed language from the U.S. Supreme Court in saying that the public
school teacher performs a task "that goes to the heart of representative
government." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). The court also
advanced the argument that as an authority figure for children, the teacher has a
significant impact on the community.
See also Johnston v. Corinthian City
Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978). The court said it could "think of no
higher community involvement touching more families and carrying more public
interest than the public school system" and Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474
U.S. 953 (1985) (Brennan, dissenting).
Brennan quoted from the newspaper
column under question to accent his case for the importance of high school
employees:
"When a person takes on a job in a school,
whether it be as a coach, administrator or even maintenance worker,it is well
to remember that
his primary job is that of educator.
"There is scarcely a person concerned with
school who doesn't leave his mark in some way on
the young people who pass his way--many are the
lessons taken away from school by students which
weren't learned from a lesson plan or out of a
book. They come from personal experiences with
and observations of their superiors and peers,
from watching actions and reactions." [d. at 955-56.
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ST A TES IN ACCORD WITH LIPSCOMB
Other courts have argued on policy grounds that making a teacher a public
official would stifle creativity 50 and have said a teacher's control is too remote
to be authoritative. 51
served

by

the

Other courts have focused on the size of the audience

newspaper;52

asked

whether

the

institution

was

a

uniquely

government affair;53 whether the position had any administrative or supervisory
duties;54 whether it required any intrusion into the intimate details of daily
lives;55 or whether the employees would reasonably be aware that they were
forfeiting some privacy rights. 56
Still other courts have asked whether the
57
position is a highly visible one.
The policy-based argument in other states holding teachers to be private
citizen diverges greatly from the Lipscomb reasoning.

Implicit in the policy

argument "is the concept of a freedom 'of the governed to question the governor,
of those who are influenced by the operation of government to criticize those
50 In
Franklin
v.
Benevolent
and
Protective
Order
of Elks, Lodge 1108, 97 Cal.App.3d 915, 159 Cal.Rptr. 131 (1979), the California
Supreme Court said that a rule making teachers public officials, and therefore
remediless for all defamation excepting where actual malice is present, would
stifle the teacher's expression and intellect and lead to less effective teaching.
51 [d. The California court said that while a public school teacher invites
public scrutiny and discussion, the policy behind the concept is to "allow the
governed to question the governors," and the teacher's governing or control in
the classroom is too remote and philosophical to qualify on those grounds. See
also McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 I1I.App.3d 421, 54 III. Dec. 913, 425 N.E.2d 1130
(1981); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
52
Johnson v. Board of Junior Colleges, 31 III.App.3d 270, 276 n.l, 334
N.E.2d 442 n.1 (1975). The court held that the public figure status of a college
professor was due to his actions during the controversy, and that the teacher was
a public figure only for purposes of media that specifically served the school
audience, in this case the college newspaper. In a later case the court further
narrowed the circumstances where a teacher could be a public figure.
McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 I1I.App.3d 421, 54 I1I.Dec. 913, 425 N.E.2d 1130 (1981).
53
True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986). The state supreme court
analysis consisted of distinguishing the public school teacher from a police
detective, a position they had recently held to come under the public official
doctrine.
The court said that a detective is a public official because he is
involved in law enforcement, and the duties of a law enforceinent official are a
uniquely government affair.
54

[d.

55

[d.

56

[d.

57

Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
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who control the conduct of government."58

The use of the word "control" in this

argument is much stronger than the language of Rosenblatt, where the Supreme
Court said there need be apparent control or substantial responsibility for the
conduct of government affairs. 59
The school teacher fits much better into the second category, substantial
responsibility.

Education is a government affair, perhaps the most important

government affair at the state and local level, and the school teacher is the
direct link between the government and the populace in this function.

As the

primary

carries

medium

substantial

of

the

government

responsibilities.

Further,

message,
the

the

private

teacher
citizen

certainly
decisions

such

as

Lipscomb do not articulate the reasons why a teacher's control is "too remote or
philosophical."

•

The policy argument says that there' would be a chilling effect on teacher
effectiveness if they were subject to this defamation exception.

However, the

courts do not attempt to balance this evil against the countervailing harm of a
chill on the media.
shield for the media.

The public official doctrine was developed originally as a
When a court ignores this factor it loses sight of the

original intent of the doctrine.
BRENNAN'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL DOCTRINE
Justice Brennan wrote a dissent from a certiorari denial on the public official
question in

Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich.60

Brennan, the author of the
Rosenblatt decision, advocates a return to the standards set out in that case. 61
He gave a more expansive interpretation of the public official doctrine than the
state courts and recognized that small newspapers would be singled out to bear
the burden of a decision favoring teachers as private citizens. 62
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, said that a narrow reading of the doctrine
would unnecessarily deprive publishers of the "breathing space"6S allowed for
public expression and thus lead to a chilling effect on reports about borderline
private individuals.

The justices were most concerned about the effect on

reporting by local papers, who rely heavily on coverage of these borderline
58
Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Lodge 1108, 97
Cal.App.3d at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
59

Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 85.

60

474 U.S. 953 (1985).

61
See also Elder, Defamation, Public Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v.
Baer Criteria -- A Proposal for Revivification: Two Decades after New York Times
v. Sullivan. 33 Buffalo L. Rev. 579 (1984).

62

[d.

as

[d. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963».
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public officials.

Small, non-daily newspapers have the fewest resources and are

more easily influenced by threats of a lawsuit and potential libel damage
awards. 54
CONCLUSION
An examination of the state court decisions reveals no clear trend in either
direction on whether a public school teacher is a public official.

The decision in

New York Times v. Sullivan was announced a quarter century ago, yet courts
continue to come up with contradictory results when assessing whether a teacher
is a public official.
One problem is that many courts confuse public official and public figure
theories and interchange the definitions and criteria of the two concepts.

There

were several other issues in the Lipscomb case,65 the key issue being whether
Cox acted negligently in gathering information for publication, and the public
figure issue was given only threshold analysis.

The

court

did

little

more

than reiterate the minimal defamation protections under Gertz.
Classifying a public school teacher as a private citizen causes much more of a
chill on small newspapers than large ones.

Small town newspapers devote much

more coverage to schools and teachers than larger papers, and limitations in
terms of capital, copy editing expertise and legal advice amount to a much greater
chill on their ability to publish than on the ability of larger, daily newspapers.
With little funding, it is easy for a small newspaper to be intimidated by the
fear of a long, drawn-out lawsuit.

Small newspapers traditionally employ persons

with limited or no formal journalism training to write and edit articles. Cox, the
author of the article in Lipscomb, received his college degree in economics, not
journalism. 66 Because of this lack of expertise in the editing process, the news
editor of a small paper is going to be more reluctant to assign a story that has
54
In Lipscomb the jury awarded the plaintiff $1,000,000 in compensatory
damages and $45,000 in punitive damages. Supra n.5.

65
In addition to the public official question, the court cited two main
issues, and three collateral issues:
(I) If Lipscomb was not a public official, was negligent publication by Cox
and the newspaper subsumed in the jury's finding of a publication with reckless
disregard for the truth; and, if so, was the evidence in this case sufficient to
support a finding of negligent publication?
(2) Was the evidence in this case sufficiently clear and convincing to support
the jury's finding of publication by Cox with a reckless disregard for the truth,
which Lipscomb must establish to recover punitive damages?
Collateral issues were the admissibility of an expert's opinion on the
standard of care, the obligation of a trial court to segregate potentially
defamatory evidence from nondefamatory evidence in its instruction to the jury,
and the size of the jury's verdict. 234 Va. at 281, 362 S.E.2d at 34.
66.

234 Va. at 297 n.6, 362 S.E.2d at 43 n.6.
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libel potential, and, when those stories are covered, the paper will err on the
side of less coverage to avoid the risk of a defamation suit.
The third effective chill on small papers deals with their comparative lack of
legal assistance.

While large papers can afford to have in-house counsel to

prevent a libelous article from being published, or at least to mitigate the damage
once a mistake has been made, small papers usually can only afford to retain an
attorney to deal with problems after they have risen to the level of an impending
lawsuit. In Lipscomb, the Virginia Supreme Court could have avoided this problem
by exercising its power to give defamation defendants protection beyond the
minimal federal requirements extended in Gertz. 6T
Coverage of borderline public officials, including schoolteachers, is

the

mllinstay of rural, non-daily publications which do not have the resources or
economic incentive to cover national events' and figures. The market for coverage
of larger events and people is adequately served by the metropolitan and national
newspapers.

People buy rural and non-daily newspapers to keep themselves

informed on local matters such as religious organization activities, business and
club functions, educational matters, and crime reports.

The court does not fully

realize the chill it has cast on small newspapers with the Lipscomb decision.
Small papers do not have the resources to challenge this action.

Any challenge

in court must come from a larger metropolitan newspaper with the resources to
take a court battle to Virginia's high court.

Until then, local press in Virginia

will be restrained from coverage of many of the events which make their
publications viable.

6T
The Virginia Constitution contains an "abuse" clause where "any cItIzen
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right ... " Va. Const., Art. I, Sec. 12. While some
state courts have relied on similar "abuse" provisions to follow the minimal
protections of Gertz, see, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.2d 184 (1975); McCall v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 975 (1982). Other state courts have not felt themselves bound by similar
clauses, see, Diversified Management v. Denver Post, Inc. 653 P.2d 1103. (Colo.
1983); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162
Ind.App. 671 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
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VESTED RIGHTS IN LAND USE: MUNICIPALITIES V. DEVELOPERS
INTRODUCTION
Zoning is an area of the law which involves two opposing interests. Walter F.
Witt, Jr., a partner in the law firm of Hunton & Williams, aptly summarized this
opposition, saying, "The public interest in land use regulations, which is subject
to frequent changes because of shifting demands, is set against the interest of
landowners

and

developers

permissible land uses."l

which

depends

on

determining

with

certainty

Nowhere is this conflict more apparent than in the issue

of whether rights can vest in uses given by municipal zoning ordinances.
A vested right is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) as:
Rights which have so completely and definitely accrued to or settled
in a person that they are not subject to be defeated or cancelled by
the act of any other private person, and which it is right and.
equitable that the government should recognize and protect, as being
lawful in themselves, and settled according to the then current rules
of law. . . .
Such interests as cannot be interfered with by
retrospective laws; interests which it is proper for the state to
recognize and protect and of which the individual cannot be deprived
arbitrarily without injustice.
Vested rights, with respect to zoning, have evolved from the 14th Amendment's
Due Process clause in the United States Constitution, which prohibits the illegal
"taking" of an individual's property without just compensation. 2
Such rights are normally held protective of only the existing uses made by the
landowner.

There is no right, generally, to the continued existence of a zoning

ordinance and to any prospective uses which are allowed thereunder.
"[I]t is clear . . . that an amendatory zoning regulation
cannot be applied so as to require destruction, removal,
or abatement of pre-existing structures or uses. It is
equally clear, however, that a landowner who merely
hopes or plans to develop his property in a certain way
at some time in the future has no protection against
zoning changes prohibiting such development."s
The question is therefore where to draw the line between pre-existing uses and a
"mere hope" of development.
THE LAW IN GENERAL
As mentioned above, there is no right to the continued existence of a given
zoning ordinance.

The rule in a majority of states allows for such ordinances to

I

"Vested Rights in Land Uses", Planning in Virginia, January, 1988.

2

4 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, Sec.50-03(1).

S

49 ALR3d 13 Sec. 2(a).
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have retrospective effect on properties upon which there is no existing use. 4
Further,

a

landowner

acquires

no

vested

rights

to

continue

or

complete

construction, or to initiate or continue a use, unless, prior to the effective date
of the legislation, he has relied on a validly issued building permit, in good faith,
by substantially changing expenditures or obligations.

There are two major

exceptions to this rule.
According to the "Washington Rule," the right to develop the property vests at
the time the permits are applied for in good faith.

The ordinance in effect at

that time is controlling, rather than any ordinance adopted subsequently.5 This is
the most liberal rule, as it allows the point of vesting to be controlled totally by
the developer, without regard to his loss if the subsequent ordinances were held
applicable.
The other exception, known as the "Illinois Rule," allows for vesting to occur
at the time an application is made in good faith, as long as the landowner's
position

with

regard to the land has· substantially changed, either through

expenditure or obligation.6

This rule falls somewhere between the majority and

Washington rules, in that it allows for vesting to occur at the earlier period in
time (i.e., when the application is made), but requires the landowner to show the
harmful affects from applying the subsequent ordinance.
Many scholars and academics who have written on this subject have made a
distinction between equitable estoppel and vested rights.

Equitable estoppel

focuses on the equities of the situation while upholding the municipality's right to
rezone retrospectively.

The vested rights issue focuses on the property interest

of a landowner and the consequential lack of governmental police power to take
such property away.7

Equitable estoppel is normally used in states which follow

the majority rule, in order to give relief from the harshness of that rule, while
vested rights analysis is used in the states that follow one of the exceptions.
Whether in the form of equitable estoppel or one of the exceptions to the
majority rule, the theoretical foundation is the same:

fundamental fairness.

The

Supreme Court of Illinois recognized this and named the injustice resulting from
upholding such a retrospectively-applied amended ordinance as their reasoning for
the so-called "Illinois Rule."
4
See 4 Rathkopf Sec. 50.03(3); 49 ALR3d 13 Sec. 2(a); 50 ALR3d 596 Sec.
2(a); American Law of Zoning (3rd Ed.) Sec. 606.

5 See 1988 Zoning and Planning Law Handbook, Clark Boardman Company,
Ltd., New York, New York, 1988~ quoting Valley View v. Redmond, 107 Wash.2d
621 (1986), and West Main Associates v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d (1986).
6

4 Rathkopf Sec. 50.03(2).

7

See Witt, supra note I, at 15.
38

"Where an individual or corporation expends substantial sums
relying on the then existing zoning and zoning ordinance and
proceeds to seek a permit in compliance with them, it would be a
grave injustice to allow municipal officials to hold up action on
issuance of a building permit until an amendatory ordinance could
be passed, changing the standards to be met so that a permit
formerly lawful would now not be issued due to an abrupt change
in the law."s
Most courts, in analyzing this fairness, do so by looking at the "good faith" of
the parties involved. In order to find good faith on the applicant's part, courts
look to many of the following factors: 9
purchase of the property in question for the specific use indicated in the
application for the building permit.
relative usefulness of the subject property for other purposes.
duration or stability of the zoning classification existing when the permit
application was. filed.
openness in dealings with municipal officialS, including inquiry into the
current zoning status of the applicant's property and into the existence
of any proposals to change the zoning, and free and full disclosure of the
applicant's plans.
receipt of assurances from municipal officials as to the legality of the
proposed construction or as to the issuance of the requested permit.
payment of filing fees or other costs in applying for a building permit.
expenses and obligations incident to preparation for construction, such as
payment of architectural or engineering fees, performance of preliminary
site

work

not

requiring

a

building

permit,

entering

contracts

for

construction, supplies, and other building obligations, and similar matters.
Similarly, in an effort to determine just resolutions, courts will aJso look at
factors which relate to the municipality's good faith, such as: 10
Inordinate or unexplained delay in processing the subject application, or
its flat refusal to issue the requested permit at a time when Its issuance
was lawful.
Affirmative efforts to mislead the applicant or lull him into believing that
his permit would be issued as a matter of course.
The fact that the rezoning process was initiated solely because of the
applicant's proposed construction, and was aimed at thwarting his plans.

S

Cos. Corp. v. City of Evanston, 27 Bl.2d 570 (1963).

9

50 ALR3d 596 Sec. 2(b).

10.

[d.
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Imposition of frivolous, technical, or previously unenforced requirements
with

respect

to

the

permit application or the applicant's

plans and

specifica tions.
In applying rules that also require the landowner to show a substantial change
in position, there has been wide variance as to what constitutes fulfillment of
that requirement.

One theory requires the change in position to be measured in

dollars and for that amount to be considered substantial when measured relative
to the total development costs.

This position has obtained momentum in many of

the states applying the majority and Illinois niles. 11
THE LAW IN VIRGINIA
Currently, the law in Virginia with respect to vested rights is unclear.
Section 15.1-492 (Vested rights not impaired; nonconforming uses) of the Virginia
Code provides relief to landowners who wish to continue an existing use allowed
for under an old ordinance but prohibited under a subsequent one.

Of course,

this type of relief is in line with most' states and does not help in determining
the issue at hand. The case law gives far more guidance but leaves undecided the
specific issue of whether and when a prospective use, as allowed for under the
existing ordinance, can become vested in a landowner, who has not yet actually
begun using the property.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has generally settled zoning issues with the
underlying premise that a balance between the individual landowner and the
society at large must be maintained so as to provide predictability in the law.
The zoning statutes of Virginia, and those
enacted by her political subdivisions, are designed to strike a
delicate balance between private property rights and public
interest.
One who owns land always faces a possibility of its
being rezoned. However, our policy, which holds that permissible
land use should be reasonably predictable, assures a landowner that
such use will not be changed suddenly, arbitrarily or capriciously,
but only after a period of investigation and community planning,
and only where circumstances substantially affecting the public
interest have changed.
As we said in Fair fax County v. Snell
Corp., 214 Va. 655, 659 (1974): 'Such stability and predictability in
the law serve the interest of both the landowner and the public.'12
Given this general proposition, there are two cases, decided in 1972, which
have universally been viewed as landmark cases in Virginia for this area of the

Fairfax

law:

Service. 14

County

v.

Medical

Structures 13 and

Fairfax

County

The cases are, for the most part, factually identical.

11

See Witt, supra note I, at 16.

12

Cole v. City Council of Waynesboro, 218 Va. 827, 834 (1977).

13

213 Va. 355 (1972).

14

213 Va. 359 (1972).
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v.

Cities

They involve

property

for

which

special

use

permits

complainant's purchase of the property.

had

been

obtained

prior. to

the

The landowner then filed site plans with

the appropriate Fairfax County authorities. Subsequent to the filing of these
applications but prior to their approval, the County Board of Supervisors amended
the pertinent zoning ordinances, so as to void the special use permits upon which
the site plans were based. In Medical Structures, the court said:
[T]hat where, as here, a special use permit has been granted under a
zoning classification, a bona fide site plan has thereafter been filed
and diligently pursued, and substantial expense has been incurred in
good faith before a change in zoning, the permittee then has a
vested right to the land use described in the use permit and he
cannot be deprived of such use by· subsequent legislation. IS
The Board of Supervisors in Medical Structures· relied heavily upon McClung v.

County of Henrico. 16

McClung was issued a valid building permit based on a

normal zoning classification and the zoning ordinance was subsequently amended
so as to prevent the use allowed for in the permit, if construction was not begun
in ninety days.

The subsequent ordinance was allowed to control in that case

even though McClung had cleared and graded the land, set up building

stakes,

hauled building stone to the site and contracted to have the foundation dug and
poured.

The court, after a detailed analysis of the definition of construction,

denied that McClung's activity constituted a construction start.
The court distinguished McClung in the latter two cases by saying that
although the landowner had acquired a vested right in the use given by the
permit, as was the case in Medical Structures, such rights expired when McClung
failed to start construction within ninety days as was required by the zoning
ordinance.

Even though the court claimed there were factual differences and did

not specifically overrule McCiung, McClung is clearly not in line with the court's
reasoning in either Medical Structures or Cities Service.

Practically speaking, it

has lost any precedential power it might have had outside of its factual setting.
In Cities Service, decided immediately after Medical Services, the Court quoted
its decisions from Medical Services and found that the developer had acquired a
vested right in the site plan application. based on the use allowed to him by the
special use permi t. 17
The line of reasoning used by the court in Medical Structures and Cities

Service is generally thought to put Virginia among those states which follow the
"Illinois Rule."
the

point

that

Those in opposition to this reading of those cases, however, make
special

use

permits

are

far

different

from

IS

Fairfax County v. Medical Structures, 213 Va. at 358.

16

200 Va. 870 (1959).

17

Fairfax County v. Cities Service, 213 Va. 359, 362 (1972).
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normal

zoning

classifications.

Whereas special use permits offer the municipality an opportunity

for site specific analysis and give the landowner an objective governmental act
upon which to rely, normal zoning classifications give neither.

That argument

normally concludes by calling for building permit approval to be the <point in time
at which vesting occurs with regard to such classifications.
Even if this line of reasoning were followed, building permit approval would
have to be replaced by site plan approval.

If not fully accepting the Illinois rule,

the court, in Medical Structures, cleady found, at least with regard to urban
development, that the site plan had replaced the building permit as an appropriate
point in time to mark both the landowner's and government's intent with respect
to the property.

"Under current planning practice in many urban localities, the

site plap has virtually replaced the building permit as the most vital document in
the development process."18
In addition to Medical Structures and Cities Service, Planning Commission v.

Berman 19 has also been upheld as a key Virginia Supreme Court precedent in this
area and furthers the premise that Virginia is following the Illinois Rule.

In that

case, the landowner applied for site plan approval for a restaurant in an area
which was zoned to allow for such a use and which, in fact, had several freestanding restaurants already.

The landowner applied for site plan approval after

having amended the preliminary plan, per the Planning Staff's recommendations.
The site plan was denied by the Planning Commission, at which
landowner filed for a writ of mandamus.

time the

Subsequent to all of these events, the

City Council amended its zoning ordinance to prohibit the proposed use.
The trial court awarded the writ, but on appeal to the state supreme court,
the City claimed the amended ordinance should have been the law applied by the
trial court.
ruling, after

The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the trial court's
finding

that the ordinance was

precipitated

by

the site plan

application of the landowner. In doing so, the court said:
The trial court has found on credible evidence
that at the time their petition was filed, appellees had complied
with all provisions of the ordinances of Falls Church and the
usual procedures and requirements, or were ready, willing and able
to comply. Under such circumstances, approval of the site plan
and the issuance of a permit were no longer discretionary but
ministerial and mandatory.20
This case seems to indicate that the site specific analysis associated with
special use permits and site plan approval is not a factor which should be
18

Fairfax County v. Medical Structures, 213 Va. 355, 357 (1972).

19

211 Va. 774 (1971).

20

[d. at 776-7.
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considered by the courts of Virginia in their analysis of this issue.

It is also an

indication that normal zoning classifications are a sufficient governmental act
upon which landowners should be able to rely in making their development plans.
The specific issues of whether a landowner has a vested, right in a by-right
use 21 allowed for under the zoning classification of his land and 'outlined in his
site plan application and, at what point in time such a right vests, have not been
decided by the Court.

Two recent cases in Alexandria involve exactly these

issues. The facts of each case are virtually identical.
The first case (F ADCO) was decided against the landowner and remains on
appeal before the Virginia Supreme Court. 22

In this case, the developer filed a

site plan for construction of a 150-foot office building, which height was allowed
under the existing ordinance.

Subsequent to the application, the ordinance was

amended so as to prohibit heights over 50 feet, with heights of 77 feet allowed
for

by

special

use

permit;

The

amended

ordinance

gave

retroactive effect to all site plan 'applications not yet approved.

its

restrictions

The Planning

Commission denied F ADCO's 'application based on the amended ordinance and the
City Council affirmed their decision.

FADCO sought a declaratory judgment and

the city filed a motion for summary judgment.

In awarding summary judgment,

the circuit court said that, absent a special use permit or another form of
govern men tal approval specific to the applicant's property, the applicant had no
vested interest in the site plan application for a proposed use.
The second case was in federal district court but was settled before the court
made its decision. 23

In Potomac Greens, the developer filed a site plan for a use

allowed under the existing ordinance.

At the public hearing before the, Planning

Commission, it was determined that the height of the building applied for
exceeded the heights permitted by the existing ordinance and,' by agreement,
consideration of the site plan was deferred.

A revised site plan, with a lower

height, was then submitted for the Commission's next public hearing.

Prior to

the developer's first application, the City Council had initiated the process of
amending its ordinance, to prevent the use applied for by the developer without a
special use permit.

The ordinance became effective between the time the revised

site plan was filed and heard by the Planning Commission at its next hearing.
21
Under a given zoning ordinance, a landowner is allowed some uses
automatically or "by right", and some uses under a special use permit, if such a
permit is approved by the municipality.
22
First Ameriland Development and Construction Company (FADCO) v.
City of Alexandria, At Law No. 1132d (1987).
23

Potomac Greens v. City of Alexandria, Civil Action 831A (E.D. Alex.

1987).
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The case was never decided.

The memoranda for both sides, however, typify

the pro and con arguments of this issue.

The developer argued that laws are

generally not applied retroactively and that that rule applies in Virginia to
"substantive" as well as "vested" rights. As precedent, he cited Shiflet v. Eller 24
and Potomac Hospital Corp. v. Dillon. 26 Further, he claimed that the decisions in
Medical Structures and Cities Service were distinguished as involving special use
permits. Additionally,. citing Sullivan v. Town of Salem 26 and Bain v. Boykin,27
he made the argument that a case should be determined by the law as it exists at
the time of decision by the court.

He also argued that laws are routinely given

retroactive effect where the legislative branch enacting such a statute has
indicated that such was their intent.
In

fur~hering

this reasoning, the city makes its most compelling argument by

citing Chesterfield Civic Association v. Board of Zoning Appeals,28 a case decided
by 0W-_ S.llpreme Court of Virginia two years after the court's landmark decisions
in lv!edical -Structures and· Cities Service.

In Chester field, the developer applied

to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) for a special use permit, which the BZA
was allowed to ·grant under the existing ordinance. Subsequent to the landowner's
applications but prior to the BZA's decision, the County Board of Supervisors
amended the ordinance withdrawing the power of the BZA to grant special use
permits, reserving it to themselves.
retroactivity of the law.

The amended ordinance was silent as to the

The BZA awarded the special use permit and the

complainant civic association then filed a writ of certiorari to have the decision
overturned.

The court overruled the BZA's grant of the special use permit by

upholding the retroactive effect of the amended ordinance.

The city used this

case to press the point that local governments have the unquestioned authority to
amend their own zoning ordinances and to apply such an amended ordinance to
any pending applications.
While this is admirable advocacy, it is probably not a fair reading of that case.
The court, in Chester field, primarily based its decision on the fact that the
authority

to

grant special

use

permits

Supervisors or a like governing body.

ultimately

resides

in

the Board

of

Further, the court said that that body is

able to. delegate that authority and, as in Chesterfield, to withdraw any such
authority so delegated.

Since the authority was withdrawn from the BZA before

24

228 Va. 115 (1984).

26

229 Va. 355, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985).

26

805 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1986).

27

180 Va. 259 (I 942).

28

215 Va. 399 (1974).

44

they acted upon the application, the application approved subsequently was held to
have been invalidly approved and as such, was void. ;
In a more recent case in Alexandria, this line of reasoning was used by the
city

to defend

itself against another claim

involving a

retroactive

Dominions Lands v. The City of Alexandria. 29

ordinance.

zoning

In that case, the

developer submitted a site plan for a development 'which met the existing height
limitations of 50 feet.

The planning staff recommended approval.' The site plan

was scheduled for review by the PlanriingComniission' on September I, 1987, arid
the developer claimed it was in conformance with the existing ordinance and that
they

were

"ready, willing

recommendations.

and

able

to

comply"

with

the

planning

staff's

The Planning Commission deferred the review ,until October 6,

1987 and then recommended an amendment to the city ordinance which would
have limited the height of development in the area to 30 feet, with 50 feet
allowed for by special use permit.
The city council then failed to approve the ordinance before the October 6th
review and the Planning Commission was thus forced' to recommend approval.
These actions may have been prompted by an action in mandamus which was filed
by the developer when it heard of the proposed ordinance.

The city council

subsequently approved the amended ordinance on October 13, 1987. The adjacent
property

owners

appealed

the

approval

of

the

site

plan

by

the

Planning

Commission, additionally claiming that the amended ordinance should be applied to
the case on appeal. The developer filed for a declaratory judgment and when the
matter came before the council, they deferred it until the issue could be settled
in Court.
Primarily relying on Planning Commission v. Berman 30 and'Shiflet v.' Eller,31
the developer maintained that site plan approval was a ministerial function, that
they were "ready, willing: and able" to proceed with construction under the
existing zoning and that statutes are presumably prospective and should not be
given retroactive effect.
The City argued two points.

First, it argued that the case was not ripe,

because the use required by Dominion Lands could still be applied for and that it
had not been to date.

Secondly, citing' Chester field Civic Association v. Board of

Zoning Appeals,32 the city argued that final authority for approval of site plans
rested with the city council and so many preliminary administrative approvals

29

At Chancery No. 18106 (1987).

30

211 Va. 774 (1971).

31

22,8 Va. liS (1984).

32

215 Va. 399 (1974).
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could not be relied ,on by the developer.

Therefore, the city council should be

able to apply the law as it exists when' they make their final review of a site
plan.
The circuit court, however, found in favor of the developer.

First, it held

that having a by-right use changed to a use available only by permit was injury
enough to warrant adjudication.·

Secondly, the court, citing Medical Structures,

said that the preliminary. site plan had virtually replaced the building permit and
that once its approval was given, the building permit was normally given as a
matter of course.

Therefore, the ordinance passed subsequent to Planning

Commission approval of such a site plan should not be given retroactive effect,
especially because there was no indication by the council, in approving the
or.ciinance, that they intended to give it such an effect.
CONCLUSION
The case note briefs of the lower court opinions above signify both the
complexity of this issue and' its unsettled state in the Commonwealth.

The, issue

will hopefully be decided by the holding of the Virginia Supreme Court in the
F ADCO litigation.

The following is an attempt to prognosticate the outcome of

that case and thus, give a fair reading of the court's precedent in this area.
The two most important cases remain Medical Structures and Cities Service.
These are the only cases in which the court specifically recognizes the "vested
rights" of a property owner to a use of his prope:ty allowed for by local
ordinance, while. deciding a zoning issue.

Although both cases in vol ve uses

allowed the landowner by previously awarded special use permits, the opinions of
the cases focus on the substantial change in position of the landowner in reliance
upon a use so given and not upon the legislative act conferring those rights
originally.
First, the CO,urt included the argument of Medical Structures in its opinion,
that "once a diligently pursued site plan is filed in reliance upon existing zoning
or the issuance of a special use permit, fairness dictates that a vested right is
acquired in the land use.,,33

The court then followed this statement of the

respondent with its finding that the site plan has replaced the building permit as
the most important, document for development, saying, "The filing of such a plan
creates a monument to the developer's intention, and when the plan is approved,
the building permit, except in rare situations, will be issued."34
Immediately following that case, the Court decided Cities Service, which they
found "factually similar," and said, "[a]ccordingly, we hold that Cities Service's

38

Fairfax County v. Medical Structures, 213 Va. 355, 357 (1972).

84

[d. at 358.
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right to the land use described in the use permit vested upon the filing of the
site plan .... "36
Attempts are often made to distinguish these cases as involving special use
permits, as stated above.

Normally, this is done by quoting the respondent's

argument as outlining the issue to be

reliance on the existing zoning and/or the

special use permit, and then stating how the court specifically refused to decide
the broader issue and only decided as to the use given by a special use permit.
This is then interpreted as an affirmative act by the court to hold that site plans
based on normal zoning classifications do not carry the same vested rights as do
plans based on special use permits.
A

fairer

interpretation,

given

the

dicta

in

both

cases

concerning

the

substantial expense which both developers had incurred in preparation of their
site plans, would be that the court simply chose not to settle issues not directly
before it.

Continuing the reasoning of the court in these cases to its logical

conclusion concerning the issue of this memorandum, it would simply not make
sense to protect the substantial expense incurred by the landowner prior to a site
plan's submission with regard to use given by a special use permit and not grant
the same protection to a developer whose plan is predicated upon a by-right use
given

by

a

normal

zoning classification.

Both are legislative acts of the

governing body regulating a landowner's property which are subject to change,
and, barring such a change, should be grounds upon which a landowner can rely
in making plans for the use of his property.
In addition to these case precedents, the court's holding in Berman also
bolsters the argument that rights should vest at the time a site plan is filed, even
when it is based upon normal zoning classifications.

In that case, the court's

decision found site plan approval by the governing body of a municipality to be
"ministerial' and mandatory" rather than "discretionary" where the landowner was
"ready, willing, and able to comply" with the applicable ordinances or usual
procedures and requirements of that locality.36

Further,

the

most

recent

case involving land use issues, Cole v. City Council of Waynesboro,37 upheld land
use predictability as being of paramount importance. The court said that land use
designations should not

be suddenly changed but altered only after careful

consideration "and only where circumstances substantially affecting the public
interest have changed.,,38
36. Fairfax County v. Cities Service, 213 Va. 359, 362 (1972).
36

211 Va. 774, 776-7 (1971).

37

218 Va. 827 (1977).

38

[d. at 834.
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Clearly, these cases taken in concert place Virginia more in line with the
Illinois rule than with either the majority or Washington Rules, as quoted earlier.
The rule in Virginia, therefore, would seem to be, that a landowner acquires a
vested right in the use applied for in a site plan, at the time in which such a
plan is filed in good faith, if such a use is a designated by-right use under the
existing zoning classification of the land for which the site plan is filed, or the
use is founded upon a previously-issued special use permit.
The only case which may fall outside of this analysis of the Virginia Supreme
Court precedent in this area is Chester field Civic Association v. Board of Zoning

Appeals. 39

In that case, the court held that the ultimate police power to make

zoning decisions lies with the legislative body of a municipality, as granted by the
Gel}eral Assembly, and that, therefore, such power may be reserved to that body
so as to void any applications before lower administrative agencies, or decisions
subsequent to such a reservation. The argument could be made for extending this
holding to include the further premise that any site plan application before the
Planning Commission can be held invalid at the governing body's pleasure, as the
Commission's power of approval is delegated to it by the local governing body,
and therefore, it cannot be relied on by the developer in making his plans.
This argument was attempted by the city in the Dominion Lands case but was
That reading of Chester field would

rejected by the circuit court of Alexandria.

be in direct conflict with the decisions in Medical Structures. Cities Service and

Berman.

There is no precedent for the notion that only the governing body's

approval is enough of a governmental act upon which the landowner can state
reliance, because only that body has constitutionally delegated police power. Even
conceding this case as precedent, a municipality would presumably have to
completely withdraw a Planning Commission's power to itself before any pending
applications

Chester field.

would

lose

their associated

vested

rights, as

was

the case in

Local city councils and/or Boards of Supervisors are unlikely to

take this drastic step in order to thwart one developer's plans.

Further, any

repeated use of this mechanism would surely be held as an "arbitrary and
capricious" act and therefore illegal as against the "Due Process" clause of the
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
ST A TUTOR Y RELIEF
Even if the above rule is an effective reading of the existing Virginia Common
Law in this area, problems remain.

The two most obvious are those of (I) what

constitutes a "filing" and (2), at what time an ordinance becomes "existing"; or,
phrased differently, when is an application made in good faith.

39

215 Va. 399 (1974).
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Although, the prospective supreme court holding in the FADeO litigation could
conceivably settle these disputes, it is unlikely, given that court's propensity for
failing to settle issues not strictly within the facts of the case before it.

A more

appropriate remedy for this issue, in any event, is legislation by the General
Assembly of Virginia.
Walter F. Witt, Jr., in his article "Vested Rights in Land Uses,"40 gives a solid
proposal for such legislation which adequately balances the individual landowner's
rights and the interests of the public at large, as well as complying with the
pertinent

precedents

of

the

Virginia

Supreme

Court.

He

proposes

three

legislati ve steps.
Legislation which provides for rights in land uses which have become

(I)

vested by way of existing zoning ordinances and a landowner's reliance
upon them.
(2)

Legislation which prescribes points in time at which such rights become
vested. He maintains that three such points exist:
When an application is made for subdivision of a residential
property.
When an application for site plan approval is made with relation to
a multi-family, commercial, or an industrial project.
When an application for a building permit. is made.

He maintains

that such legislation should, likewise, require accompanying land use
or building plans so as to satisfy the substantial expenditure
requirement as a matter of course.
(3)

Legislation which defines time limits for such vested rights, so as to
invalidate such a right, as acquired above, if the project is not begun
within a designated time period.

While, as a

whole, these proposals are a good foundation upon which

legislation could be based, there are some factors which are not considered and
should be.
With respect to the second step, a specific body should be designated as the
agency to whom an application must be made for rights to vested.

The most

appropriate and equitable body would probably change according to the type of
application,

but should

be spelled out

nonetheless.

Likewise, the

type of

application to be made should be specifically outlined for each situation (i.e.,
preliminary versus final site plan).
Additionally, a caveat should be included which defines existing law as a law
which has actually been passed by the local governing body, thereby relieving the
developer from considering any proposed legislation.

40

Witt, supra note 1.
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Actual adoption by the

governing body is not only a clear point in time upon which to base the
legislation, but also prevents proposed statutes from obtaining prospective effect
and thus delaying a developer's plans based on laws which may never be passed.
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VIRGINIA'S FELONY - MURDER DOCTRINE:
FROM HASKELL TO KING AND THE PROBLEMS IN-BETWEEN
INTRODUCTION
English common law extended the punishment for murder to cases where a
murder occurs during the commission of a felony. The common law classified this
as secondary to the murder, but today it has been codified into what is known as
the felony-murder doctrine. 1 The doctrine allows an accomplice to a felony to be
convicted of murder if one of the principals of the felony kills someone while
perpetrating the felony.

What follows is an analysis of the elements of the

felony-murder doctrine, and of some of the problems that the Virginia court
system has faced in defining these elements.
DISCUSSION
Elements of the Underlying Felony (Felony Requirements)
In order to apply the doctrine, the principals in the first and second degree
must be in the process of committing a felony, one element of which is an actus
reus (voluntary act) by each party.

The key act by the accomplice is a voluntary

action of aiding and abetting, keeping watch or lookout, encouraging, or inciting
the "principal in the first degree" while the felony is either being planned 2 or is
in progress. 3
1
People v. Goldvarg, 346 Ill. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931).
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981).

See also Wooden v.

Brief History of Felony-Murder
The felony-murder rule developed as a natural part of common law murder.
Its consequences were of no real concern when the rule was originally applied
because the punishment for all felonies was death. The underlying felony had the
same punishment as the killing that took place as a corollary to the felony. It is
only in modern times when the punishment for felonies changed to include
penalties other than death that the felony-murder rule came under attack for its
harshness.
The contention by many jurists, who oppose the doctrine, is either that
felony-murder is unnecessary because it is subsumed under statutory murder or
that felony-murder is unfair because it punishes without proving culpability. For
these reasons, many states have either abolished felony-murder (Kentucky, Hawaii
and Michigan) or have restrained its use (Arkansas, Delaware and New
Hampshire). People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
However, the state of Virginia has codified felony-murder in two statutes
that give it wide applicability to criminal proceedings in the state. Va. Code
Ann. Sees. 18.32-33 (1988).

2

Horton v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 848, 38 S.E. 184 (1901).

3
Moerhing v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 290 S.E.2d 891 (1982). See also
Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 265, 343 S.E.2d 465 (1986); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 180 Va. 733, 107 S.E. 809 (1921); Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va.
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The second element of a felony is mens rea (intent to commit a felony).·
The accomplice must act with purpose, and must consciously engage in felonious
Shared criminal intent with "principal in the first degree".6

conduct.

element can be fulfilled by inference if actus reus is met.

This

However, if this type

of purposeful conduct is lacking, one may use the "willful blindness" rule set
forth in United States v. Jewell. 6
In that case, the defendant was paid one hundred dollars to drive a car across
the

United States/Mexican border.

The defendant did not know that one

hundred and ten pounds of marijuana was in the trunk of the car. The defendant
contended that he was not an accomplice because he lacked the criminal intent
necessary for the illegal transportation of the drugs.

The court held that he

should' have inquired further from the "principal in the first degree" as to why he
was being paid to drive across the border.

The court termed the defendant's

conduct "willful blindness" and ruled that intent may be proven by a showing that
the accomplice should have been aware that the conduct he was participating in
was probably felonious. 1

A reasonable man standard, similar to that used to

demonstrate negligence, should be used to prove "willful blindness".8
370, 157 S.E.2d 907 (1967); and Va. Code Sec. 18.2-18 (1982 and Supp.1986,
1987).
The full text of the Virginia statute Sec. 18.2-18 reads:
How principals in second degree and accessories before the fact punished.-In the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree and every
accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all
respects as if a principal in the first degree; provided, however, that except in
the case of a killing for hire under the provisions of Section 18.2-31 (b) an
accessory before the fact or principal in the second degree to a capital murder
shall be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though the offense were
murder in the first degree.

4

Horton v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 848, 38 S.E. 184 (1901).

6
Hall v. Commonwealth, 225 Va 533, 303 S.E.2d 903 (1983).
Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 306 S.E.2d 886 (1983).

6

United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).

1

[d.

See also

8
[d.
The language used by the court in Jewell is consistent with a
negligence standard of reasonable care.
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Actus Reus (First Element of Felony-Murder)
Aside from the felonious act, felony-murder requires a necessary sequence of
events leading up to the murder. 9
the intent to kill.

The intent to commit the felony must precede

If not, the murder is independent of the felony and the

accomplice is not liable under a felony-murder theory.10

Thus, a felon (principal

in the first degree) cannot kill his victim and then decide to rob him.
The murder must occur during the felony as defined by the actus reus. Generally,
this question, is answered in part by the satisfaction of the proximate cause
requirement.

The determination of the length of time encompassed by the felony

is critical to the application of the doctrine. l l

In Haskell, the defendant helped

to rob a sailor in the city of Norfolk by offering the sailor a ride and then
stopping at a predetermined location for his counterparts to rob him.
robbery had ended, the sailor would not allow the felons to escape.

After the

Finally, one

co-felon shot the sailor in the chest to ensure their escape.
The court in Haskell overruled Mason v. Commonwealth, where felony-murder
was not applied to an escaping felon.12

The court in Haskell ruled that "the

felony-murder doctrine applies where the initial felony and homicide were parts of
one continuous transaction and' were closely related in point of time, place, and
causal connection, as where the killing was done in flight from the scene of the
crime to prevent detection or promote escape."13

The court in Haskell, citing

People v. Salas, stated "... robbery is not terminated until the robber has won his
way to a place of temporary safety".14
The classic fact scenario is People v. Gladman.

The felons were termed to

still be in the process of committing the felony even though they were in a
parking lot a half mile from the murder-robbery site.

The court held that the

felons, who were fleeing a delicatessen, were in the process of robbing the store
9
This section refers not to the existence of the underlying felony, but to
additional elements that must co-exist with the underlying felony to establish
felony-murder actus reus.

10 LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, 637 (2d ed. 1986).

11

Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033,243 S.E.2d 477 (1978).

12 Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 105 S.E.2d 149 (1958).
13 Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. at 1041, 243 S.E.2d at 482.
14
[d., citing People v. Salas, 7 Ca1.3d 812, 500 P.2d 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 431,
58 A.L.R.3d 832 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 939 (1973).
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until they had traveled to a safe and secure place, and until their "booty", if
there was any, was safe.16

Stipulated Felonies (Part of the Felony-Murder Actus Reus)
There;'are two classes of felonies to which the felony-murder doctrine applies,
and varying punishments that accompany these two classes. The first class is
statutory and is listed in the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32. 16 This class includes
arson,

rape,

forcible

sodomy,

burglary, and abduction.

inanimate

penetration,

robbery,

The punishment is that for a Class 2

The second class of felony is stipulated in the Va. Code Ann. Sec.
If an accidental murder occurs as a result of any other felony not

listed in Sec.
.15

sexual

The accomplice to any of these felonies is charged with

first degree murder if a killing occurs.
felony.17
18.2-33. 18

object

18.2-32, the felony-murder doctrine can apply.19 However, the

People v. Gladman, 41 N.Y.2d 123, 359 N.E.2d 420 (1976).

16. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 (1982 and Supp. 1986, 1987).
The full text of the statute reads:
First and second degree murder defined; punishment.-Murder, other than capital murder, by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, or by any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or in the
commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate
object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction, except as provided in
Section 18.2-31, is murder of the first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony.
All murder other than capital murder and murder in the first degree is
murder of the second degree and is punishable' as a Class 3 felony.

17

See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981).

18. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-33 (1982 and Supp. 1986,87).
The full text of the statute reads:
Felony homicide defined; punishment.-The killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties,
while in the prosecution of some felonious act other than those specified in
Sections 18.2-31 and 18.2-32, is murder of the second degree and is punishable as
a Class 3 felony.
19
In Aaron, the Michigan Supreme Court contended that the inherent
unfairness in the felony-murder doctrine stems from holding felons guilty of
accidental deaths that should be categorized as manslaughter, not murder, because
there is no malice. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
However, in the actual usage of the doctrine this flaw is corrected through
the use of proximate cause "foreseeability· and "furtherance of the felony· rules.
If a death is foreseeable then there is an inherent danger in the underlying
felony.
This danger connotes reckless behavior and malice by a felon who
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accomplice can only be convicted of second degree murder and is punished for a
Class 3 felony.2o
In addition to these two accepted classes, a new class is developing beyond the
felonies in the statutory listing of the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32.

Under

Heacock v. Commonwealth any "inherently dangerous" felony that can cause death
or serious injury regardless of whether the death is accidental can be used to
apply the doctrine. 21 In that case, a drug dealer distributed cocaine to some
friends at a party. One friend went into convulsions and died after ingesting the
The court in Heacock deemed the killing nonaccidental, but applied the

coke.

felony-murder doctrine, although drug possession is not one of the felonies listed
under the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32.
The court held that the felony was in the possession and ingestion of the coke
and that the defendant aided and abetted the perpetrator by distributing the
cocaine to him in the first place.

The court further stated that cocaine is

"inherently dangerous" to human life and its ingestion is not accidental.
court concluded that "inherently dangerous felonies" are a
felony-murder punishable as a second degree murder offense.

Thus the

new category of
The defendant

contended that felony-murder could not apply because the victim was a co-felon.
However, the court ruled that a co-felon can be a victim for purposes of felonymurder. 22
Although the court applied Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-33 as to the punishment of
the offense (second degree murder), the court, like other courts, seemed to be
hinting

that an "inherently dangerous felony" could constitute first degree
murder. 23
The judicial trend in the future of Virginia seems to be toward
proceeds without regard to the danger.
Additionally, the "furtherance of the
felony" rule shows that the killing was not accidental, but contributed to the
success of the underlying felony. The unfairness must not be in the killing and
the nonuse of manslaughter, but in holding the accomplice liable for the murder
when he had no intent to commit it. For a discussion of transferred malice see
footnotes 41 and 50.

20

See Whiteford v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. 721 (1828).

21

Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984).

22

[d.

23
The Virginia Supreme Court used language more consistent with Va.
Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 than with Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-33. However, it found
the murder to be second, not first, degree as Va.· Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32
specifies. [d.
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expanding Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 to include "inherently dangerous felonies·,
but with the advent of a more restrictive Virginia Court of Appeals which now
hears all criminal appeals, this expansion seems unlikely.

Thus, four years after

the supreme court's opinion in Heacock there are still no Virginia cases that
expressly hold that Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 should be expanded. 24

Virginia's Accomplice Doctrine (Validating Felony-Murder)
According to Briley v. Commonwealth, a "principal in the second degree" is as
culpable as the "principal in the first degree" if the accomplice has met the actus

reus and the mens rea requirements of the felony. Hence, the felony-murder

24.

Felony-Murder and the Death Penalty

Although an accomplice cannot usually be convicted even under Va. Code
Ann. Sec. 18.32 of capital murder, the United States Supreme Court made an
exception in its recent decision in Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676 (1987), reh'n
denied, 107 S.Ct. 3201 (1987). In that case two brothers broke their father out of
prison. While escaping, their car broke down in the desert. To obtain another
vehicle, the father stopped a car on the highway and killed the family in the car.
The brothers did not participate in the killing, but sat idly by while their father
brutally killed the family. The Supreme Court held that the initial felony was the
escape ant that the killing occurred while the escape was still in progress. The
felony-murder rule was therefore applicable to the killing. Although this would
normally result in the brothers' conviction for first degree murder, the fact that
the brothers showed reckless indifference to human life by watching their father
kill the family without attempting to stop him warranted the death penalty for
both brothers.
Thus the death penalty can apply to special cases of felonymurder.
Does this explanation of felony-murder and the death penalty demonstrate
the continued reasoning as set out by the common law in regard to felony-murder
and deterrence? Francis B. Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law, 527-531 (1930), quoting
Regina v; Seme and another, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887) and People v. Washington, 62
Cal.2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
The answer to this is
embodied in the difference in the degree of culpability between an accomplice
who has no knowledge of the approaching murder until after the fact and an
accomplice who is a witness to the entire incident and has the opportunity to
stop the murder. The difficulty is in how foreseeable the murder must be to the
accomplice at the scene of the crime. Surely if the principal pulls out a gun and
shoots the storekeeper spontaneously, the accomplice has no time to stop the
murder. The court determines the reasonableness of the opportunity. As to the
degree of culpability and its application to the common law policy behind felonymurder, it seems that as the culpable conduct of the accomplice rises, so does the
ability that the accomplice possesses to deter the murder. Under the robbery
scenario, the ability to deter the principal is less than in Tison where the two
brothers just stood by and watched. Since the common law policy of deterrence
is at the heart of the doctrine, it is only logical that the punishment should
increase with the need to deter". Seen in this light, one may better understand
how the United States Supreme Court in the majority opinion written by Sandra
Day O'Connor reached its conclusion in Tison.
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doctrine holds the accomplice liable for the murder committed by the "principal
in the first degree."25

Corpus Delicti (Second Element of Felony-Murder)
The second general requirement that must be satisfied is that someone must be
killed. 26 However, death does not need to occur during the actual felony, but
must be a proximate result of injuries received during the commission of the
felony.27

If a body is not found, this requirement may still be satisfied by

showing circumstantial evidence of the death.28

Proximate Cause (Third Element of Felony-Murder)
The third requirement is that the felony must be the proximate cause of the
This requirement is composed of a two-pronged test.
murder. 29
First, the
murder must satisfy the traditional "but for" prong.

"But for" the commission of

this particular felony by the principals in the first and second degree, the murder
would not have taken place. so Generally, if one proves the felony and the corpus
delicti, one also passes the "but for" prong. S1
25
26
18.2-32.

Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563,273 S.E.2d 57 (1980).
Smith v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 809 (1871).

See also Va. Code Ann. Sec.

27 State v. Shortridge, 54 N.D. 779, 211 N.W. 336 (1926).
28 Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 294 S.E.2d 882 (1982).
29 Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d. 811 (1981).
Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32.
so

See Doane v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500, 237 S.E.2d 797 (1977).

SI.

The "Year and a Day" Rule Re-Explored

See also

The "but for" analysis includes the traditional "year and a day" rule.
Although the rule is still used in murder cases today, the rule is treated as a
rebuttable presumption, not as a concrete stipulation. The rule evolved due to
the absence of medical practices that could adequately determine the causes of
death. Thus, the rule supplied the State with a means of ascertaining proximate
cause. If the defendant's act was over a year from the victim's death, than
proximate cause could not be established and the defendant would be set free. In
today's world of high tech medicine, the determination of cause is much easier
than when the traditional rule was established.
For example, in a case of
poisoning, where the traditional rule would fail to establish proximate cause if the
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The second prong of the test is much more stringent than the initial "but for"
prong.

Because the murder is classified under the "but for" prong as dependent

on the felony, the second prong narrows this link by adding the requirement of
foreseeability to the picture. The murder must not only be· dependent, but it
must also be foreseeable. 32 In Haskell, the foreseeability issue is satisfied by Va.
Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32, as a murder in connection with any of the listed felonies
is foreseeable perse. 33
According to People v. Kessler.
theory".M

this second prong is deemed the "accomplice

In Commonwealth v. Redline this "Accomplice Theory" was refined

from mere nexus or foreseeability to furtherance of the felony.35

A co-felon or

accomplice is only liable for the actions of the "principal in the first degree" if
the murder was in the furtherance of the felony; that is, the murder must be the
nattIral and probable consequence of the felony.36

Haskell reemphasizes this

prong by defining "furtherance" in the Virginia court system as "closely related in
point of time, place, and causal connection".37
Thus in a case where felons are robbing a store and the store manager fights
back, the use by one felon of deadly force to kill the manager is foreseeable. 38
Additionally, the felon furthered the success of the robbery by killing one who
poison had been administered over a long period of time, medical science today
can trace the cause of death directly to the poison and establish proximate cause.
As a result, medical science has availed the State a method in which the
traditional rule can be rebutted.
See generally, Rollin M Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law, 690-96 (2d ed. 1969).
32

[d.

33

Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033,243 S.E.2d 477 (1978).

34

People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. 1974).

36 Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981).
36

See also

[d.

37 Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. at 1041, 243 S.E.2d at 483.
38
It is within contemplation that people may be hurt in a robbery, as
stipulated in Va. Code Ann.18.2-32. The legislative intent was to deem certain
crimes dangerous by their very nature and thus limit judicial mercy by stipulating
the punishment as a class 2 felony (first degree murder). Va. Code Ann. 18.2-32
(1982 and Supp. 1986, 1987).
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had the potential to apprehend him.

In this situation the second prong would be

satisfied because a tighter link between the robbery and the murder would be
established.
The harder case is an accidental murder.
steals from his employer.

For example, suppose an embezzler

While escaping from the premises with the money, he

inadvertently pushes an innocent bystander into the street where the bystander is
killed by an oncoming car, or kills someone while operating the getaway car.
the death of the bystander a foreseeable consequence of his felony?

Is

Perhaps the

better question is whether this killing furthers the felonies just committed so as
to be causally connected to them.

Ultimately, the satisfaction of the second

prong is not as automatic as it may see,m. 39

See King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988), as
39
the difficulty in determining "furtherance" and proximate cause.

an example of

Note: Confusion over Proximate Cause (The Evolution of Proximate Cause in the
Virginia Court System)
There is confusion among Doane. Haskell. Heacock. King (an Appeals Court
case), Wooden, which cites Redline, as to how they fit into the overall picture of
proximate cause. "In Doane v. Commonwealth we reserved the question whether
the application of the rule requires a showing of causal relationship or whether a
showing of mere nexus will suffice. We do not decide that question here because
it is foreclosed by the evide'nce which we consider conclusive."
Heacock v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 404, 323 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1984) (citing Doane v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500, 237 S.E.2d 797 (1977».
The Virginia Appeals Court
used this quote in Heacock to decide for itself that proximate cause was not mere
nexus, but causal connection.
King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988).
Thus, in the court's opinion it decided an issue that the Virginia Supreme Court
would not. However, the Virginia Supreme Court in Heacock (1984) overlooked its
decision in Haskell (1978), which occurred a year after Doane (1977). Heacock v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 397, 323 S.E.2d at 90.
In Haskell the court defined its position on proximate cause not as "mere
nexus", but as causal connection. The "felony-murder statute applies where the
killing is so closely related to the felony in time, place and causal connection as
to make it a -part of the same criminal enterprise." Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218
Va. at 1044, 243 S.E.2d at 483. The Wooden case in 1981 adds to the confusion by
citing proximate cause through the Redline definition, but ,made no attempt to
define what "furtherance of the felony" as stipulated in Redline meant as applied
to Virginia law. Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981).
Thus, in order to clear the confusion, one must continue to rely upon Haskell in
truly understanding what "furtherance" or proximate cause in regards to felonymurder connotes in Virginia.
Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. at 1944, 243
S.E.2d at 483. The key is in the causal relationship between the felony and the
murder. Therefore, the grand conclusion of the Virginia Court of Appeals in King
had already been decided by the Virginia Supreme Court ten years earlier in
Haskell.
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Malice Aforethought (Fourth Element of Felony-Murder)
The last requirement of the felony-murder doctrine is mens rea.·o

The

intention to commit the actual murder, as well as to commit the felony, is
According to Wooden, all of the requirements of common law murder

required.

must be satisfied by the accomplice (principal in the second degree) in order to
apply

the

felony-murder

doctrine."

The

actus

reus

is

satisfied

by

the

accomplices' participation in the initial felony, the corpus delicti and proximate
cause requirements are satisfied as described in the previous two sections and the

mens rea requirement is satisfied by the application of a rule stipulated in
Heacock.· 2

.0.

Discussion of Mens Rea

There are generally four levels of intent: purpose (specific intent), knowing
(general intent), reckless (unjustifiable risk or gross negligence), and negligence
(lack of reasonable care).
The mens rea or intent required by felony-murder shifts in accordance with
the underlying felony. This is due to the implied malice inherent in the doctrine.
Thus, robbery which connotes a specific intent carries over to the murder. This
is a logical progression of intent, as Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32 would apply the
felony-murder rule to the charge of first degree murder. First degree murder,
like robbery, is a specific intent crime. Larceny is also a specific intent crime,
but does not come under the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32 in its application of the
felony-murder rule. The defendant in a larceny case is convicted under the Va.
Code Ann. Sec. 18.33 felony-murder rule of second degree murder, yet the larceny
defendant had the same type of intent as the robber in the first scenario. Can it
then be presumed that Felony-Murder is a specific intent crime applying to Va.
Code Ann. Sec.Sec. 18.32 and 18.33 equally? The answer is no.
An example
is found in nonfeasance crimes, as when a truck driver fails to comply with a
safety regulation that is required under federal law. The crime is not a specific
intent crime, but one of general intent.
The intent distinction is due to a
circumstance in which the driver may be aware of the way a chemical is being
transported without being aware of the regulations that govern that
transportation. The result is termed "strict liability". If someone is killed due to
the lack of compliance with the safety regulation, the driver could be found
guilty of second degree murder under the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.33 felony-murder
rule because. the failure to meet the safety regulations is a felony.
Thus, a
general intent crime can impute the malice necessary to establish second degree
murder.
This proposition defeats any notion of logical order between the
underlying felony and the murder as it would pertain to Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.33
mens rea.
Therefore, one may conclude that all specific and general intent underlying
felonies apply to Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.33, while only specific intent crimes
pertain to Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32.
All crimes stipulated under the latter
statute are specific intent crimes.
Recklessness and negligence have no application to the rule .

•1

Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758,284 S.E.2d 811 (1981).

42

Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984).
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According to the Heacock rule, the act of committing a felony gives rise to
imputed (implied and constructive) malice.",3

This malice satisfies the intent

requirement for mens rea or "malice aforethought"."'"'

Malice is imputed because

the felons who committed the murder had the original mens rea necessary to
commit the original felony.

Hence the felony mens rea is transferred to the

murder and satisfies by judicial interpretation the malice requirement. Therefore,
as a matter of law, if the accomplice meets the intent requirement for committing
the felony, he also meets the intent requirement for the murder.

As a result,

the accomplice may be liable for the murder of an innocent victim by the
principal felon through transference.
However, there are certain exceptions to the Heacock rule that tend to limit
its application in regard to the imputation of malice in the felony-murder
doctrine.

There is no transference where the victim is killed by anyone other

than one of the felons. 45
existed previously.

To do otherwise would impute malice where none had

The malice of the "principal in the first degree" is imputed to

his accomplice in the felony only.

This distinction is very important as a

policeman or victim who shoots a co-felon cannot be used as a "principal in the
first

degree"

to convict one of

the other co-felons

for

the

murder of

a

conf edera teo 46
43

[d.

44

See Commonwealth

45.

Where does Felony-Murder malice originate?

V.

Gibson, 4 Va. 70 (1817).

There have been many theories as to how the malice is actually transferred.
Some jurists have argued that the malice comes from the "principal in the first
degree", Wooden V. Commonwealth, 222 Va. at 758, 284 S.E.2d at 811.
Others
have specified that it is the inherent nature of the original felony that gives rise
to the malice, Heacock V. Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 397, 323 S.E.2d at 90.
However, the best reasoning behind the imputation of malice comes from the
common law. Francis B. Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law, 527-531 (1930), quoting
the common law from Regina V. Serne and another, 16 Cox e.C. 311 (1887) and
People V. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777,402 P.2d 130,44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
Because the common law purpose is to punish accomplices who could have
prevented the murder by not participating in the original crime, the mens rea for
the initial felony passes to the murder regardless of the nature of the underlying
felony and regardless of the intent of the "principal in the first degree". For
this reason it is entirely possible for a robber to accidentally kill a victim
without malice. If the robber dropped his weapon, thereby setting off the trigger
and killing a bystander, his malice would be constructively transferred, to the
accomplice. For a discussion of the problems that come with the court's view of
malice in Wooden and Heacock see footnote 50.
"'6

Wooden

V.

Commonwealth, 222 Va. at 758, 284 S.E.2d at 811.
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An example of this scenario is found in Wooden.

In that case, the felons

broke into the victim's apartment at night and waited for him to return in order
to rob him.

When the victim arrived, he shot and killed one of the felons.

The

court held that the other felon, the defendant in the case, was not liable for the
death of his co-felon as the victim's shooting was done without malice and was
classified as a justifiable homicide. 47 The same rule applies to police officers
who kill co-felons in a shootout. 48
In Heacock, it was further held that a felon who aids and abets another felon
(principal) in committing a felony and the principal felon dies either accidentally
or due to the dangerous nature of the felony, malice is imputed to the accomplice
felon.49

King v. Commonwealth (A Problem Case)
King v. Commonwealth raised questions about the scope of "furtherance" and
the meaning of "inherently dangerous".50

The defendant and victim were in the

business of transporting and distributing illegal drugs for a drug smuggling
operation.

While flying over North Carolina and Virginia the victim, who was

piloting the plane without a license, flew low in order to evade detection by law
enf orcement agencies.
47

While flying at this dangerous altitude, the pilot lost

Id.

48
See Redline v. Commonwealth, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) (a
policeman shot a felon and malice was not imputed.)

49. Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984).

Malicious Suicide?
The logic behind the imputed malice theory seems to break down in Heacock.
The malice not only is imputed from the principal, but from the nature of the
felony.
The disturbing Question presented is whether in a felony other than
murder there can be imputed malice as. a matter of law. Larceny, for example,
has no malice element, yet under the required Felony-Murder conditions the court
could deem its existence. Even if this notion of malice from the felony were
rejected, the court would still be left to decide whether one can have malice
towards oneself. For the principal's malice to be imputed to the accomplice, the
malice is transferred from the principal's intent to the accomplice's. Thus the
principal must direct his malice toward himself to transfer it to another. If this
be true, than it begs the question, "Can suicide be malicious?" The answers to
any of the questions that present themselves when a discussion of the imputed
malice in Heacock is commenced will continue to be controversial and disturbing
until the court explains how the malice element of Felony-Murder in this case is
truly satisfied.
50

King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988).
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control of the plane and crashed into a mountainside.

The other felon, the

defendant in the case, who acted as navigator, was the only one who survived the
crash. He was convicted under the felony-murder doctrine. 51
The court in King incorrectly held that the act of distributing drugs was not
"inherently dangerous", even though the Virginia Supreme Court heid in Heacock
that marijuana is of the class of drugs that is "inherently dangerous".52

The

court in King distinguished that case from Heacock' in that Heacock involved
cocaine, but here marijuana, a less harmful drug, was involved. 53
However,
according to the supreme court's reasoning in Heacock concerning drugs that can
kill, both cocaine and marijuana are "inherently dangerous".
The best argument against using marijuana under the felony-murder doctrine
that the court in King should· have mentioned is not that it is not "inherently
dangerous", but that in most states possession below a certain amount is a
misdemeanor and not a felony.

Distribution,· as stated in Heacock, makes the

dealer an accomplice to the felony of possession.

Thus, if the possession is not a

felony, the first requirement of felony-murder is not met and there is no
transference of malice to the accomplice.
The key to this case was not the blunder by the Court of Appeals in
incorrectly

defining

"inherently

dangerous",

but

in

its

misinterpretation

of

According to Haskell and Wooden the murder must "further" the
felony in a causal connection. 54 However, that connection does not need to be
proximate cause.

as restricted as the court in King believed.
51

The court in King found

no

[d.

52 "Inherently dangerous" refers to drugs that have the propensity to kill
and. to. ,be addict,ive. See gene.rally. Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 404, 323
S.E.2d at 97. Unfortunately, in many states mere possession of various classes of
"inherently dangerous" drugs is not a felony. An example of this classification in
Virginia is marijuana. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-248 and Sec. 18.2-249 (1982 and
Supp. 1986, 1987).
53 However, just as cocaine can kill, so maTlJuana can kill also. Although
marijuana is cumulative in nature and not prone to an overdose as is cocaine,
according to Helen Jones, a noted drug expert, marijuana can kill brain cells and
cause cancer and heart disease.
Jones, On Marijuana Reconsidered, Addictive
Behavior: Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 109-113 (1985).
See also R. Petersen,
Marijuana Overview, Addictive Behavior: Drug and Alcohol Abuse 116-126 (1985).
Additionally, marijuana is addictive like cocaine.
"One of the most widely
accepted misconceptions about marijuana is that a user will not develop physical
or psychological dependence. Neither is true." [d. at 112.
54. Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 1044,243 S.E.2d 477,483 (1978).
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connection between the fog that caused the accident and the drug trade,56 but
failed to consider the reason why the plane was in the air or why it was flying
low in mountainous terrain, which an experienced pilot, such as the defendant,
would not do. 56

The court contended that the cause of the crash was the fog.

The principal cause of the crash was in fact the low flying, not the fog, done to
hide from law enforcement authorities so as not to be caught transporting a
controlled substance. 57

The ring leader of the smuggling organization admitted

that his employees were flying ridiculously low for ascertaining their location. 58
There was a "causal connection" between the crash and the felony.
The victim was furthering the felony by flying low to avoid detection.
defendant was aiding and abetting the victim by navigating the plane.

The

Hence,

.

proximate cause is easily established and the faulty reasoning of the court in

King, which restricted "furtherance" and felony-murder, should be disregarded in
favor of the Virginia Supreme Court's more expansive ruling in Haskell which
gives the felony-murder doctrine a more expansive reading.

Possible Defenses to the Felony-Murder Doctrine
In order to fully understand the scope of the felony-murder doctrine, one must
not only be acquainted with the elements necessitating the doctrine, but also
with the defenses that may be used by the defendant.

There are eight defenses

to felony-murder that may be employed by the defendant at trial. Seven of these
defenses are categorized as affirmative defenses and

acknowledge

that the

prosecution has made out a prima jacie case against the defendant for the crime
charged. The burden rests with the defendant to prove his affirmative defenses.

1. Prosecution's Failure To Meet Its Burden
This is the most common of all the defenses that can be used and is the only
nonaffirmative defense that can be employed by the defendant.

Failure by the

prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the aforementioned
elements to felony-murder will constitute a valid defense.
55

The major factor

King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988).

56
The defendant contended that he flew low to avoid bad weather and to
locate himself. Any logical inquiry into the facts would render this argument
incredible. The better choice that an experienced pilot, like the defendant, would
make would be to fly above the fog and radio the nearest airport for assistance.

57.

[d. at 10-11.

58
See Appellee Brief at 10, King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988)
(No. 0998-86-3).
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facilitating the successful use of this defense by the defendant is disproving the
underlying felony.

In all cases, the dismissal of the underlying felony amounts to

a dismissal of felony-murder.

2. Withdrawal
The accomplice can contend that he had withdrawn from the felony and that
the causal connection between the accomplice and the felony had been broken
before the murder took place. 59

The accomplice cannot just use verbal language

to withdraw but must be physically remove himself.

The strongest case for the

withdrawal defense is when the accomplice calls the police to stop the "principal
in the first degree" from completing the felony.60
3. The New York Defense

This defense is presently unrecognized in Virginia, but is a persuasive theory
that has been made part of the criminal code in New York. The requirements for
this defense are as follows:
"Principal in the second degree" did not directly aid the "principal in the

1.

first degree" in the commission of the homicide.
2.

"Principal in the second degree" was not armed.

3.

"Principal in the second degree"

did not think the "principal in the first

degree" was armed.
4.

"Principal in the second degree" had no reasonable grounds to believe that
the co-felon intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or
serious physical injury.61

Although this is a minority view, it is a well-liked theory that may have success
in the future in Virginia. 62

59

State v. Thomas, 140 N.J. Super. 429, 356 A.2d 433 (1976).

60

[d. at 433.

61

N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 125.25(3) (1987).

62

LaFave and Scott, supra, at 10.
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4. Self Defense
The defendant may attempt to show that the "principal in the first degree"
acted out of necessity in fear for his own life in killing the victim. 6s The
difficulty in sustaining the argument lies in the standard of the self defense
doctrine.

The standard states, in part, "a man shall not in any case justify the

killing of another by a pretense of necessity, unless he were without fault in
bringing that necessity upon himself."64

In a case of felony-murder, the killing is

only necessary because of the felon's culpable conduct.

Hence, self defense is

never a viable affirmative defense to felony-murder.
5. Intoxication
The defendant claims that he was intoxicated and did not possess the required
intent to kill the victim or to commit the felony.

•

The use of intoxication to

negate an intent to kill is a g.enerally accepted. defense to premeditation in first
degree murder.

However, in felony-murder the malice is imputed so as to avoid

an analysis of the specific intent to kill.
underlying felony must be proven.

Only the intent to commit the

Thus the use of intoxication to void mens rea

is valid only in regard to the underlying felony.
Voluntary intoxication has consistently been held not to be a bar to the
question of intent,65 but if shown acts only to mitigate premeditation in first
degree murder.66

Therefore, if an accomplice becomes voluntarily intoxicated

before the felony in order to get up his nerve to participate in the crime, he may
not use his lack of sobriety as an excuse.
valid defense to felony-murder.

Only involuntary intoxication is a

Involuntary intoxication as it pertains to forming

the prerequisite intent is not a presumption, but goes to the weight of the
evidence in demonstrating whether the defendant was intoxicated enough so that
his ability to form the necessary intent was impaired. 67
6S

Clark v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 360, 18 S.E. 440 (1893).

64

Bausell v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 669, 181 S.E. 453 (1935).

65

Gill v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 445, 126 S.E. 51 (1925).

66
(1979).

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 312, 313, reh'n denied, 444 U.S. 890

67
See generally Giarrantano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94
(1980) (mere intoxication is not a per se defense to "intent").

66

6. Insanity Defense
In order to use this defense, the accomplice must be so out of touch with
reality that he cannot comprehend the character and consequences of his actions.
The defendant is classified as partially insane if he has periods of lucidity where
he can understand his actions. Partial insanity cannot be used as a defense. 68

7. Coercion
The defendant could contend under this defense that the "principal in the first
degree" forced him to be a. party to the felony, thus negating the defendant's
volition.

The defendant must establish a sufficient amount of evidence to

substantiate his claim.

Past actions of the "principal" in dealing with the

defendant supply the key evidence in this regard. 69

8. Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Eighth Amendment)
The criminal justice system's belief in fairness demands that the punishment be
commensurate with the offense.

Murder is the most serious of charges and

provokes the most extreme retribution, which in some jurisdictions includes
death.70

Thus, the burden on the commonwealth to prove murder is a strong one,

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Through the "accomplice theory" as articulated in

Briley, the accomplice is treated as a principal to the felony in which he
participated. 71

It is unfair to extend felony-murder by the accomplice theory to

a situation where an accomplice consciously participated in one felony, but is
charged in the commission of another felony.

The accomplice in that case is of

course not as culpable as the "principal in the first degree".

Even in murder

cases where there is no underlying felony, the accomplice is convicted of a lesser
offense, generally second degree murder.

In felony-murder the need to prove

culpability is deleted by Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32, which specifies a punishment

68

Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 876-7 (1881).

69
In order to determine a "reasonable reliance" by the defendant on the
fact that the principal would injure or kill him unless he helped commit the
felony, a prior history that shows a trend of abuse must be established by
extrinsic evidence. Any prior court proceedings showing abuse of the defendant
by the principal can be used toward the weight of the evidence demonstrating
coercion.

70

See generally Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.31 (1988).

71

Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 273 S.E.2d 57 (1980).

67

of first degree murder. 72

Perhaps Chief Justice Traynor put it best when he

stated that the felony-murder rule "erodes the relation between criminal liability
and moral culpability.n73
Additionally,
accomplice.

there are

problems

in

the

transference of

malice to

the

It is awkward to convict an accomplice with a general intent to

commit murder 7• of a specific intent offense such as first degree murder. 76
Malice and premeditation are imputed. 76 The result is a first degree murder
conviction under felony-murder that meets none of the elements of murder.
The question of excessive punishment is strong under these circumstances,
especially if the policy behind the punishment is general deterrence. 77 Is general
deterrence a sufficiently strong policy to impose first degree murder on an
accomplice who may not have satisfied all of the elements of murder?

The

72
Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32 (1988) (stipulation of certain underlying
felonies as raISIng the level of murder participated in by an accomplice to first
degree murder).
73 J. Cook and P. Marcus, Criminal Law 505 (2d ed. 1988) quoting People v.
Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
7.
Va. Code Ann. Sec.18.32 imputes a presumption of knowledge for certain
felonies, as mentioned above.

76. J. Cook and P. Marcus, supra note 73.
76 For a more complete discussion of malice and Felony-Murder see supra
40 and 49.
77 See generally, Francis Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law, 527, 527-31 (1930),
quoting Regina v. Serne and another, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887). Serne discusses
felony-murder in terms of the common law and implies the reasoning behind the
harsh doctrine to be twofold:
first, people intend the consequences of their
actions and second, the law must discourage dangerous felonies.
See also
Washington, 62 Ca1.2d at 777,402 P.2d at 130,44 Cal. Rptr. at 442.

Is the Felony-Murder Doctrine Fair?
There is a heated debate between jurists as to the fairness of the FelonyMurder rule. The opponents of the rule contend that an accomplice should not be
forced into rescuing a crime victim. The general rule, whether in tort law or
criminal law, is that there is no duty to rescue.
Therefore the policy of
promoting the rescue of victims either before or during the commission of the
felony by deterring the accomplice is defective.
However, the rescuer doctrine does have some notable exceptions. One such
exception is if the rescuer caused the conditions that warrant rescue.
See
Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 221 N.C. 292, 20 S.E.2d 299 (1942) and
Hardy v. Brooks, 103 Ga. App. 124, 118 S.E.2d 492 (1961).
Because the
accomplice's own actions in engaging in the underlying felony caused the
condition, it is only fair that the accomplice be held liable to remedy it.
68

question

may

only

be

answered

by

individual

legislatures

that

responsibility of weighing the pros and cons of such a contradiction.

have

the

However, a

court can impose its will on a case by case basis, and the defendant's attorney,
using an Eighth Amendment argument, must exploit that role of the judiciary to
overturn a first-degree felony-murder conviction. 78
CONCLUSION
The felony-murder doctrine allows an accomplice to a felony to be convicted
of first or second degree murder when a murder he did not commit occurs while
the felony is in progress. In order to apply this doctrine, a number of elements
must be met.

When using this legal theory to convict an accomplice, jury

instructions must contain each of the following requirements:
1.

Actus Reus (committing the initial felony)
a. The accomplice must be aiding and abetting, keeping watch or lookout,
encouraging or inciting the "principal in the first degree" to commit the
initial felony.
b. The accomplice must act with purpose or knowingly while aiding and
abetting the "principal in the first degree" to commit the initial felony.
c. The murder must take place while the initial felony is in progress.
d. The intent to commit the felony by the "principal in the first degree"
must antedate the intent to commit the murder.

2.

Corpus Delicti (crime committed by a criminal· agent)
a. There must be evidence to suggest beyond reasonable doubt that a human
being has been killed.

3.

Proximate Cause
a. "But for" this particular felony, the murder would not have occurred,
must be answered in the affirmative.
b. The murder must be foreseeable.
c. The murder must "further" the purpose of the felony by being closely
related in point of time, place, and causal connection.

4.

Mens Rea (intent)
a. As

long

as

the

accomplice

(requirements La. and

acted

with

intent

to

commit

a

felony

l.b. are satisfied), there is "implied malice" to

commit the murder and mens rea is satisfied.

However, this imputed

malice does not apply where the "principal in the first degree" is the
victim (non-felon) or a law enforcement official.
78
Although lack of Due Process is an additional constitutional defense
that could be used to combat first degree Felony-Murder, it is nevertheless a
defense that would fail because the Felony-Murder doctrine was codified and in
common usage in most jurisdictions in the early nineteenth century.
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As long as these elements are included in the jury instructions, the felonymurder

rule

may

apply.

The distinction in charges and

accomplice is based entirely on the type of felony.

penalties to

the

Any of the specifically listed

felonies under Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 carries a charge of first degree murder
and is punishable as a Class 2 felony, while any non-listed felony coupled with
accidental death or a non-listed "inherently dangerous felony" carries a charge of
second degree murder and is punishable as a Class 3 felony.
In conclusion, it may be noted that this doctrine is not as well developed in
Virginia ,as it is in many other states. As the quantity of case law expands, so
will the applicability and requirements of the doctrine.

Virginia is now beginning

to use felo.ny-murder more liberally as a viable theory in criminal law.
This trend began in the mid-1970s with the approval of the Virginia Supreme
#

Court.

However, with the new Virginia Court of Appeals, the use of the doctrine

has been restricted.

King may indicate that the court of appeals is trying to

follow in the footsteps of the Michigan Supreme Court by abolishing felonymurder.

The difference is that Michigan's felony-murder rule was never codified,

as opposed to Virginia's.

The legislative protection of felony-murder will keep

the doctrine available to prosecutors in the future with the hope that judicial
deference a goal of the law, deterring crime, will override the protection of
criminals at the expense of the community.

The doctrine may seem harsh to the

criminal, but so are the effects on a family who loses their father to a robber's
bullet.
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Appendix: Recommended Virginia Jury Instructions

First Degree Felony Homicide
The defendant' is charged with the crime of first degree murder.

The

Commonwealth must prove beyond' a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements of that crime:
l.

That (Name of Victim) was killed by (Name of "Principal in the First

Degree") who was a' party to the (Name of Felony).
2.

That (Name of the Defendant) was a "principle in the second degree" to

the (Name of Felony).
3.

That the felony committed was either arson, rape, forcible sodomy,

inanimate object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a

reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the offense as charged, then you
shall find the defendant guilty and fix his punishment at:
l. Imprisonment for life; or

2. A specific term of imprisonment, but not less than twenty (20) years.
If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt anyone or more of the elements of the offense, then you shall find the
defendant not guilty of felony homicide. 19

19
See Generally, MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, VIRGINIA MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL VOL. I 503 (1985 & Supp. 1987).

First Degree Felony-Murder is not addressed specifically in the Virginia
Model Jury Instructions, but is instead mentioned as an afterthought in the
instructions for First Degree Murder. The difficulty with the Virginia Model Jury
Instruction's definition of First Degree Felony-Murder revolves around the
inference that only the principal can be prosecuted for First Degree Murder.
That assumption is incorrect.
The purpose of the doctrine is to punish
accomplices who participate in dangerous felonies equally with the "Principal in
the First Degree". By punishing accomplices 'commensurate with the principal, the
State hopes to deter dangerous crimes by encouraging accomplices to withdraw
from assisting principal actors in the commission of dangerous felonies.
See
Generally People v. Washington 62 Cal.2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442
(1965).
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Second Degree Felony Homicide

The

defendant

is

charged

with

the

crime of

felony

homicide.

The

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements of that crime:
l.

That (Name of Victim) was killed by (Name of "Principal in the First

Degree") who was a party to the (Name of Felony).
2.

That (Name of the Defendant) was a "principle in the second degree" to

the (Name of Felony).
3.

That the killing in the (Name of Felony) was accidental and contrary to

the intentions of the defendant.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a

reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the offense as charged, then you
shall find the defendant guilty and fix his punishment at a specific term of
~

imprisonment, but not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty (20) years.
If

you

find

that

the

Commonwealth

has

failed

to

prove

beyond

a

reasonable doubt anyone or more of the elements of the offense, then you shall
find the defendant not guilty of felony homicide.80

80.

[d.

For a basic guide on how Second Degree Felony-Murder instructions should
be structured, the Virginia Model Jury Instructions are a good starting point.
However, the instructions specifically detailing Second Degree Felony-Murder are
incomplete and should not be used without further expansion.
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